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Article

Restoring Reason to the Third Party
Doctrine
†

Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba

††

INTRODUCTION
Since 1967, the Supreme Court has defined the protections
of the Fourth Amendment as extending only to information in
1
which one has “[a] reasonable expectation of privacy.” A key
application of that principle is the third party doctrine, which
allows the government to collect any information a criminal
suspect has entrusted to a third party without falling afoul of
2
the Fourth Amendment. The basis for the rule is simple: once
information is relinquished to another, its original owner loses
any expectation of privacy he or she may once have had in the
3
information.
The third party doctrine has the virtue of simplicity and
administrability. It also once had the great virtue of corresponding to the core intuitions of the citizenry in terms of ex4
pectations of privacy and confidentiality. Unfortunately, the
third party doctrine turned heavily on the limited forms of in† Law Clerk, Hon. Reena Raggi, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
†† Law Clerk, Hon. Ronnie Abrams, United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. We would like to thank Professors Jack Goldsmith, Samuel Issacharoff, Orin Kerr, and Carol Steiker for their invaluable
feedback. Copyright © 2016 by Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba.
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 563 (2009) (defining the third party doctrine).
3. Id.
4. But cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the third party doctrine, even at its inception, never
corresponded to a realistic account of individuals’ expectations of privacy);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 342–44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that taxpayers are forced by the tax code’s complexity to use accountants as intermediaries, and that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information they share with an accountant).
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teraction in a prior technological era. As society has changed,
the presumption of limited means of dissemination of information has all but collapsed, and the scope of what is covered
by the third party doctrine has thus expanded. Communications, commerce, and finance increasingly take place online and
operate through private intermediaries; accordingly, the third
party doctrine has left an immense amount of personal information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The impact of
these technological developments on police surveillance is most
5
hotly debated today in the field of data mining, but the third
party doctrine is implicated at every level of law enforcement,
from cops on the beat to the National Security Agency.
Perhaps bowing to the inevitable, in 2012 five justices of
6
the Court in United States v. Jones suggested that the third
party doctrine could no longer be maintained in its current, absolute form, although the same five justices were unable to offer a controlling alternative. The necessity of doctrinal overhaul
was further reinforced by the Court’s recent decision in Riley v.
7
California. In evaluating the search of a cell phone incident to
a suspect’s arrest, the Court unanimously found that rapid
technological change and societal expectations had rendered
impracticable the simple application of a pre-digital Fourth
Amendment doctrine. These acknowledgments of doctrinal
desuetude have only increased the tempo of suggested alternatives. Proposals for doctrinal tweaks of the doctrine are virtually a cottage industry today, but the various critiques are for the
most part chasing a moving target of evolving technology. Instead, reform must engage the twin aims of the doctrine in
terms of protecting citizen expectations of privacy and providing rational tools for law enforcement.
This Article takes up the challenge left open by the incomplete resolution in Jones. Attempting to fill this doctrinal void,
we look not to further tweaks from within the third party doctrine but instead to the Court’s development of the exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause. Following this
doctrinal foundation, we believe that courts can determine the
5. See, e.g., Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice
Stevens’s Fourth Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1735 (2006) (arguing data mining and the third party doctrine adversely affect the protections
provided by the Fourth Amendment); Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the
Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 693–701 (2014) (analyzing how
data mining is regulated by the Fourth Amendment, how it is outside the
scope of a search, and providing available alternatives).
6. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957–60 (2012).
7. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493–95 (2014).
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reasonableness of third party searches through a uniform
standard that both protects legitimate expectations of privacy
in the citizenry and at the same time is easily administrable by
law enforcement. We argue that this standard offers a workable middle ground between the current absence of constitutional protection of information in the hands of third parties and
the overburdening of law enforcement that the imposition of
warrant and probable cause requirements would entail.
In Part I we discuss the third party doctrine, examining its
roots and its current state of flux following Jones, as well as the
critiques leveled against it. In Part II we evaluate the potential
judge-made replacements put forward by courts and scholars,
concluding that they cannot offer a satisfactory solution. In
Part III we offer a new doctrinal approach. Looking to other
cases in which searches are deemed to fall outside the Warrant
Clause, we argue that third party searches are better characterized as a new type of warrant exception than as either a
search subject to the warrant and probable cause requirements
or a nonsearch unregulated by the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
our proposal shifts the focus of analysis from whether or not
examination of information in the hands of third parties should
be considered a search to when such a search is reasonable. In
8
Part IV we examine Terry v. Ohio as a model for how courts
could apply such a reasonableness inquiry while avoiding the
pitfalls of freeform judicial balancing. Instead of weighing the
interests at stake in each case, courts should weigh the interests at stake in third party searches as a general matter, and
then craft a reasonable suspicion standard that can be applied
on a uniform basis. Finally, in Part V we assess the limitations
and potential applications of this new test for third party
searches.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE
As with much of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
starting point for the third party doctrine is Katz v. United
9
10
States and its “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. In that
case, the government’s interception of Katz’s call from a public
phone booth was deemed a search because Katz, despite being
outside his home, had a reasonable expectation that his call
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 360.
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11

would remain private. Katz overturned a prior decision refusing to find a Fourth Amendment search in similar circumstanc12
es; the earlier decision had rested upon the fact that the police
had eavesdropped upon the defendant’s phone call from the
street and thus did not enter any constitutionally protected
13
space. The Katz Court declared that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places,” and renounced the theory that
14
Fourth Amendment interests must be tied to property. The
Supreme Court would later adopt a two-part framework for the
15
Katz test, first asking whether an individual had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the information, and then whether
that expectation is one that “society is prepared to recognize as
16
reasonable.”
Following Katz, the Court was faced with the task of squaring the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test with cases allowing the use of undercover agents or informants in whom sus17
pects had placed their trust. In those prior cases, the Court
had held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “a
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he volun18
tarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.” In 1971, the
Supreme Court found that the earlier cases survived the Katz
19
test. It held that “however strongly a defendant may trust an
apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not pro-

11. Id.
12. Id. at 352–53 (majority opinion).
13. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (stating that “the
sense of hearing” does not constitute a search or a seizure).
14. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. As the majority held in Jones, the Katz test
supplemented rather than supplanted the physical trespass doctrine of
Olmstead. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–54 (2012);
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
15. The test is based on Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence, which was applied by the Supreme Court thereafter. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (“Our later
cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz],
which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s
‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”).
16. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (quoting Katz, 389
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
17. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211–12 (1966) (admitting evidence of undercover officer despite entry into defendant’s home); Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) (admitting evidence of confidential
informant); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (admitting evidence of bribe of undercover agent wearing a wire); Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747, 757–58 (1952) (admitting evidence of undercover informant wearing
a wire).
18. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
19. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 568–69.
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tected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the
20
colleague is a government agent.”
Systematizing this principle, the Court articulated the
third party doctrine in a series of cases throughout the 1970s.
21
22
First, in Couch v. United States and United States v. Miller,
the Court found that the defendants had no reasonable expec23
tation of privacy in records given to an accountant in Couch
24
and a bank in Miller. Relying in part on the undercover cases,
the Court reasoned that any person “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed
25
by that person to the Government.” Therefore, the Court explained,
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
26
third party will not be betrayed.

Then, in 1979, the Court expanded the third party doctrine
27
in Smith v. Maryland. Moving beyond business records, Smith
approved the admission at trial of data from a pen register—or
a device that keeps track of dialed numbers—obtained without
28
a warrant. Investigating threatening and obscene phone calls
following a robbery, law enforcement officers asked the phone
company to install a pen register to record the phone numbers
29
dialed by their primary suspect, Smith. When the pen register
confirmed that Smith had been calling the victim, police used
the information to obtain a search warrant for Smith’s home
30
and thereafter secure an indictment and conviction. Though
the police had no warrant for the pen register, the Court denied
Smith’s argument that the pen register should have been suppressed. It held, consistent with Couch and Miller, that because
Smith “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the tele20. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). Although White
rested on only a plurality, Justice Black’s concurrence was quite broad, signaling the holding rested with Justice White’s plurality opinion. See Kerr, supra
note 2, at 568 n.38.
21. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
22. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
23. Couch, 409 U.S. at 335–36.
24. Miller, 425 U.S. at 445–46.
25. Id. at 443 (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751–52).
26. Id.
27. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
28. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 570.
29. Smith, 442 U.S. at 747.
30. Id.
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phone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment
in the ordinary course of business,” he could “claim no legiti31
mate expectation of privacy.” Further, whether or not the
phone company independently chose to keep track of these
phone records was of no moment; “that [the phone company]
had facilities for recording and that it was free to record” was
32
sufficient.
33
34
Thereafter, the Supreme Court and circuit courts dutifully reaffirmed the third party doctrine until the D.C. Circuit’s
35
and the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Jones.
Jones, discussed more fully below, turned on whether extended
Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring violated the
Fourth Amendment. While the case itself did not directly implicate the third party doctrine, five justices in concurring opin36
ions indicated a willingness to rethink parts of the doctrine.
Justice Sotomayor went so far in her concurring opinion as to
note that, given advances in technology, “it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
37
third parties.” She reasoned that the third party doctrine
is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they
dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and
the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet
service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they pur38
chase to online retailers.

Following Justice Sotomayor’s dicta, the solid edifice of the
third party doctrine has begun to erode. While some courts con31. Id. at 744.
32. Id. at 745.
33. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (relying on
Smith in finding no expectation of privacy in garbage left on curtilage); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1980) (refusing to suppress evidence
stolen from the defendant’s banker on third party doctrine grounds).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 330–31 (6th Cir.
2010) (finding that e-mail metadata—primarily to/from addresses—fall within
the third party doctrine); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th
Cir. 2008) (refusing to suppress website visitation information acquired by
computer surveillance).
35. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
36. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
37. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742;
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
38. Id.
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39

tinue to adhere to the doctrine’s strictures, other judges have
seized on the Jones concurrences and found a reasonable expec40
tation of privacy in telephonic metadata and cell-site data.
Two terms ago, the Court dealt another indirect blow to the
41
third party doctrine. In Riley v. California, the Court refused
to extend the traditional Fourth Amendment exception for
searches incident to arrest to searches of an arrestee’s cell42
phone. Decades earlier, in United States v. Robinson, the
Court had upheld the “unqualified authority of the arresting
officer to search the arrestee’s person” and accompanying ef43
fects. The Government argued that searches of cellphones
were “materially indistinguishable” from the searches of wallets, purses, and other effects that had been upheld under Rob44
inson, and the Riley Court acknowledged that a “mechanical
application of Robinson might well support the warrantless
45
searches at issue here.” Yet the Court found that mechanically
equating wallets and cellphones would be “like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon . . . . Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a ciga-

39. See, e.g., In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615
(5th Cir. 2013) (allowing the collection of cell site data under the third party
doctrine); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (permitting the mass collection of telephonic metadata), vacated, 785 F.3d 810, 824–
25 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing Jones and noting the “seriousness of the constitutional concerns” implicated by the National Security Agency’s mass collection
of metadata).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–61 (4th Cir.
2015) (finding the third party doctrine inapplicable based in part on the Jones
concurrences), reh’g en banc granted, Nos. 12-4659(L), 12-4825, 2015 WL
6531272 (Oct. 28, 2015); United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th
Cir. 2014) (endorsing the Jones mosaic theory but finding it “not necessary to
establish the invasion of privacy in the case of cell site location data”), rev’d en
banc, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. May 5, 2015) (“[L]ike the bank customer
in Miller and the phone customer in Smith, Davis has no subjective or objective reasonable expectation of privacy in MetroPCS’s business records showing
the cell tower locations that wirelessly connected his calls at or near the time
of six of the seven robberies. . . . We find no reason to conclude that cell phone
users lack facts about the functions of cell towers or about telephone providers’
recording cell tower usage.”); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33
(D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
41. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014).
42. 414 U.S. 218, 229, 235 (1973).
43. Id. at 229.
44. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488.
45. Id. at 2484.
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The Court went on to con-

[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological convenience.
With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many
Americans “the privacies of life.” The fact that technology now allows
an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the
information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders
47
fought.

More directly relevant to the third party doctrine, the
Court noted that evolving technology might render other digital-analog comparisons inapplicable: “Is an e-mail equivalent to
48
a letter? Is a voicemail equivalent to a phone message slip?”
The assumption of technological neutrality between such analog and digital communications has been critical to defenses of
49
the third party doctrine, and the Court’s apparent rejection of
this assumption undermines the doctrine’s foundation.
Today the third party doctrine remains an important part
of Fourth Amendment law, but has been called into serious
question by cases that did not directly resolve questions over its
vitality and extent. It is worth considering, therefore, whether
the third party doctrine deserves to survive, and if so in what
form.
B. EVALUATING THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE
Academics and the lower courts have long been sharply
critical of the third party doctrine, though notably almost invariably on the expectation of privacy side of the divide, with
correspondingly little attention to the legitimacy of law en50
forcement objectives. Following Katz’s formulation, scholars
have launched a two-fold critique of the third party doctrine:
first, that people’s subjective expectations of privacy do not accord with the third party doctrine, and second, that society
should not discount these expectations as unreasonable.
Technological change, many argue, has shifted people’s
subjective expectations of privacy. At one time, the argument

46. Id. at 2488–89.
47. Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
48. Id. at 2493.
49. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 2, at 579–81 (discussing the drawbacks of
the analog test).
50. Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 581, 585 (2011) (“While Smith and the Third Party Doctrine were heavily
criticized even before the Internet age, the drumbeat of criticism has intensified . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
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often goes, a person’s decision to provide information to third
parties may have evinced a lack of expectation of privacy, but
current expectations are different. In modern digital society,
individuals routinely use the Internet to communicate and to
51
store information that they would regard as quite private. For
example, the growth of “cloud storage” subjects significantly
52
more private data to the third party exception. Whereas data
may once have stayed tucked away on a computer as it could in
a file cabinet, once stored on the cloud it would be subject to
53
law enforcement’s prying eyes. Putting this intuition to the
test, one study has exposed the increasing disconnect between
actual and doctrinal expectations of privacy: people surveyed
reported that they regard many types of information falling
squarely within the third party doctrine (and thus unprotected
by the Fourth Amendment) as significantly more private than
other types that are protected by the Fourth Amendment, thus
requiring law enforcement to demonstrate reasonable suspicion
54
or even probable cause.
Critics further argue that the basic conception of privacy
inherent in the third party doctrine is outmoded. The doctrine
defines privacy as an on/off trigger—nondisclosure keeps information private, while any disclosure completely waives one’s
privacy interest. The doctrine refuses to recognize the real possibility that individuals could disclose information to third parties for limited purposes. But there is no reason to “treat[] exposure to a limited audience as morally equivalent to exposure
51. See generally Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1571 (2004) (questioning
whether privacy standards set by the ECPA provide adequate protection).
52. Cloud storage is the warehousing of digital information on a shared
server owned by a third party instead of on local hard drives. See Aaron J.
Gold, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth Amendment and Searching Cloud Storage Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2321, 2323 (2015) (“[C]loud storage is a term for storing data and files on remote drives.”).
53. See William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1223 (2010)
(arguing that free cloud services are not protected); see also David A.
Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles
to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205,
2219–20 (2009) (“[I]s it not reasonable to consider a digital account containing
the same types of materials [as a briefcase], stored in the cloud rather than on
a computer hard drive, as serving that purpose as well?”).
54. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 184, 186 (2007) (finding
that government examination of email metadata is regarded as more invasive
than pat downs and vehicle searches).
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55

to the whole world.” In fact, a more nuanced conception of privacy might be desirable, as it could encourage the sharing of
56
sensitive information and prevent the creation of “Information
Age hermits” unwilling to meaningfully participate in digital
57
society.
Technology has also altered whether such subjective expectations should be regarded as objectively reasonable. Not only
do people expect privacy on the Internet, critics of the third
party doctrine argue, but they also should be entitled to that
expectation of privacy. Transacting in sensitive information
through the Internet is, in many ways, no longer a choice. Justice Marshall expressed such concerns in his dissent in Smith:
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of
choice. . . . [H]ere, unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for
many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help
but accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of “assuming”
risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no re58
alistic alternative.

Justice Marshall’s critique has even more force today,
when eighty percent of Americans now rely on the Internet dai59
ly. As more vital services move online, it will become increas60
61
ingly difficult to apply for jobs, access government services,
62
or even communicate without using the Internet. Many have
55. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122
(2002) (“[T]reating exposure to a limited audience as identical to exposure to
the world[] means failing to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth
Amendment context.”).
56. See id. at 123 (“[O]ne might choose to forfeit some of her freedom from
exposure without thereby forfeiting all of it.”).
57. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 217 (2004) (arguing that maintaining the third party doctrine mantra “if people want to protect privacy, they should not share
their information with third parties,” will create “Information Age hermits”).
58. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Tokson, supra note 50, at 588.
60. See Anushka Asthana & Tracy McVeigh, Government Services To Be
Online-Only, OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/
2010/nov/20/government-services-online-only.
61. See DARRELL M. WEST, BROOKINGS, STATE AND FEDERAL ELECTRONIC
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2008), http://www.brookings
.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/8/26%20egovernment%20west/0826_
egovernment_west.pdf (explaining how government services are increasingly
being moved online).
62. Leslie Meredith, U.S. Considers “Internet Access for All,”
TECHNEWSDAILY (Jan. 28, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.livescience.com/8062
-considers-internet-access.html (reporting on the increasing role governments
are taking in making sure their citizens have access to the internet, and how
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argued that routing private information through the Internet is
63
now simply inevitable. Given this inevitability, Professor
Richard A. Epstein contends that use of third party intermediaries cannot be regarded as consent to government surveillance, or even as a legitimate assumption of the risk of surveil64
lance.
65
From a functional perspective, some maintain that the
third party doctrine exposes individuals to too much govern66
ment snooping. Because “it is not far-fetched for government
officials to amass data for use in silencing or attacking enemies,
67
critics, undesirables, or radicals,” the third party doctrine
prevents the courts from using the Fourth Amendment as a
68
tool to limit government misbehavior. Such concerns have not
only led eleven state supreme courts to interpret their constitu-

that affects communication).
63. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 57 (“[P]eople . . . have little choice but to
hand over information to third parties. Life in the Information Age depends
upon sharing information with a host of third party companies.”). In this vein,
some scholars have argued that internet access is a human right. See Young
Joon Lim & Sarah E. Sexton, Internet as a Human Right: A Practical Legal
Framework To Address the Unique Nature of the Medium and To Promote Development, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 295, 315 (2012) (exploring the protection of the internet as a human right). Thus far France, Estonia, Finland,
Greece, Spain, and the United Nations Human Rights Council have declared
internet access to be a human right. See Brandon Wiebe, BART’s Unconstitutional Speech Restriction: Adapting Free Speech Principles to Absolute Wireless
Censorship, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 195, 219 (2012) (discussing the restriction of the
Internet during times of crisis).
64. Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the
Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1205
(2009) (“[S]uppose the government gave notice to the world that it would engage in surveillance of all private activities at will; so draw your curtains, but
the government can still peek through. People would have to alter their conduct in order not to assume the risk. No one would accept such unilateral legislative declaration as sufficient to undermine constitutional rights that are
intended to limit the scope of permissible government action.”).
65. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 572–73 (describing what Professor Kerr
calls “the functional critique” of the third party doctrine).
66. Thai, supra note 5 (“[T]he Court has handed the government a blank
check to conduct mass surveillance through data mining third-party records
for suspicious persons and activities.”).
67. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1112 (2002) (cataloguing instances of government misuse of personal data).
68. See generally Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1272 (1983) (“[The Fourth
Amendment] has been restricted so much that it fails to offer innocent citizens
the protection to which they should be entitled under the fourth amendment.”).
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69

tions to avoid the doctrine, but have also led Congress to resist the broad exposure, passing the Right to Financial Privacy
Act in response to Miller and the Pen Register Act in response
70
to Smith.
C. WHY A JUDICIAL SOLUTION?
The legislative responses to the privacy concerns engendered by the third party doctrine—including the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Pen Register Act, the Electronic Com71
munications Privacy Act of 1986, and the recently passed USA
72
FREEDOM Act of 2015 —raise the possibility that the third
party doctrine should simply be left alone. To the extent it is
flawed, legislatures, rather than courts, may be the proper
agents to calibrate law enforcement needs with privacy concerns. The two main arguments for this position are that legislative solutions possess flexibility unavailable to constitutional
law, and that the tradeoff between security and privacy is appropriately within the realm of democratic accountability.
Professor Orin Kerr has argued that such legislative “intermediate standards deter wrongful abuse while permitting
legitimate investigations. They strike a middle ground not pos73
sible under the Fourth Amendment.” Yet as Kerr himself has
acknowledged, this argument “assumes the standard all-or74
nothing options of Fourth Amendment law,” where an investigative technique is either a search, requiring a warrant supported by probable cause, or not a search, in which case no protections apply. Adding an intermediate category—particularly,
as proposed here, one that incorporates a reasonableness
standard—significantly diminishes the inflexibility objection.

69. See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How To
Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs To Protect Third Party
Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 376 (2006)
(documenting state court decisions on adoption of the third party doctrine).
70. See Elspeth A. Brotherton, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral
Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 576 (2012) (citing
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, 92 Stat.
3697 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2012)); Pen Register Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1868 (1986) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2012))).
71. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
72. Pub. L. No. 114-23, tit. L, 129 Stat. 268.
73. Kerr, supra note 2, at 597.
74. Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1229, 1232 (2009).
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The second objection is standard to any proposal to raise
the floor of constitutional protections: why not allow society,
through democratic mechanisms, to set its own tradeoffs? And
relatedly, why not allow states to experiment with different
75
heightened protections, as many are already doing? There are
three reasons why the protection of one or more legislatures is
insufficient. First, and most basically, rights are “rights” because their enforcement does not depend on the acquiescence of
others: “[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to a vote;
76
they depend on the outcome of no elections.” The Supreme
Court has recently reaffirmed this principle in response to a
suggestion that privacy concerns with regard to evolving technology are best left to administrative protocols: “Probably a
good idea, but the Founders did not fight a revolution to gain
77
the right to government agency protocols.”
Second, democratic mechanisms may be particularly suspect when it comes to regulating police practices. Majorities
will often perceive, correctly, that the brunt of the costs of intrusive police practices are borne by others: “The core justification for legal enforcement of rights is the risk that a majority
will not bear the burdens of its laws but instead will abridge
78
the liberties of a powerless or despised minority.” Professors
Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan have noted the example
79
of sex offender registration, while others have linked the rise
of modern constitutional criminal procedure to the need to curb
majority abuse of minority populations in the Jim Crow
80
South. While rising minority political participation somewhat
ameliorates such concerns, post-September 11th police practices and the targeting of certain groups suggests the continued
81
need for judicial enforcement of rights.
75. See Henderson, supra note 69.
76. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (quoting W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
77. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
78. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197,
209.
79. Id. (“A requirement that sex offenders register with local authorities
after being released from prison is a notable example.”).
80. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1699, 1729 (2005) (“[T]he Court’s initial forays into state criminal procedure
are best understood as responses to . . . cases in which Black defendants were
sentenced to death with barely the façade of trial.”).
81. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT
THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, (Dec.
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Finally, the federalism-based democratic response is unsatisfying where the collection and analysis of third party information will often cross state lines. Citizens of one state may be
relieved to know that the legislature of their state has protected them from overbroad collection of information by state authorities, or prosecution by those authorities based on such collection, but where fifty other sovereigns collect information
across state lines the protections of a single state may be
82
somewhat ephemeral.
It is not our intent to rehash the shortcomings of the third
party doctrine, which have been thoroughly dissected in the ac83
ademic literature. We largely agree with those critiques, but
express some doubt as to whether courts and scholars have
identified a viable alternative. In the next Part we examine the
success of those critiques in identifying a promising alternative
to the third party doctrine, and subsequently we offer and
evaluate our own (hopefully superior) alternative.
II. SURVEYING THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE THIRD
PARTY DOCTRINE
Despite the near-consensus that technological development
has altered the expectations of privacy around third party information, both courts and the academy have struggled to develop a workable scheme for determining which third party information the Fourth Amendment should protect, and what
should remain available to police investigations without judi2003) (describing post-9/11 abuses against Muslims in Brooklyn federal prison); see also Turkmen v. Hasty, No 13-981, 2015 WL 3756331, at *38 (2d Cir.
June 17, 2015) (reinstating Bivens claims against high-level executive officials
after 9/11).
82. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403
(2001) (documenting state and federal collection of data).
83. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 54; SOLOVE, supra note 57; Epstein,
supra note 64; Jessica K. Fink, Protected by Association? The Supreme Court’s
Incomplete Approach To Defining the Scope of the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 521, 534 (2012); Tokson, supra note 50, at 588; Aubrey
H. Brown III, Note, Georgia v. Randolph, The Red-Headed Stepchild of an Ugly Family: Why Third-Party Consent Search Doctrine Is an Unfortunate Fourth
Amendment Development that Should Be Restrained, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 471, 473 (2009); Colleen Maher Ernst, Note, Looking Back To Look
Forward: Reexamining the Application of the Third-Party Doctrine to Conveyed
Papers, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 336 (2014); Matthew D. Lawless,
Note, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case
for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall
2007, at 1, 33–35; Loewy, supra note 68, at 1234. See generally Kerr, supra
note 2, at 570–73 (collecting scholarship).
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cial oversight. Competing and complementary theories have
been advanced from across the ideological spectrum. These theories can be separated into three groups: the mosaic theory
originating in the courts; categorization approaches crafted by
different scholars; and case-by-case balancing pushed by more
textualist thinkers.
A. MOSAIC THEORY
The first approach, “mosaic theory,” was developed by the
84
D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard, and has since been
85
86
carried forward by other judges and academics. Most significantly, five Supreme Court justices signaled agreement with
the underlying principles of the mosaic theory in the course of
87
affirming Maynard in United States v. Jones.
The D.C. Circuit in Maynard reversed Antoine Jones’s conviction because it found that the government’s extended surveillance using GPS data had violated the Fourth Amend88
ment. During their investigation, police tracked Jones’s
movements using a GPS device planted on a car for twenty89
eight days. In finding that a search occurred, Judge Ginsburg
compared the aggregation of data to the creation of a mosaic in
90
which the whole reveals more than the sum of its parts. In
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases, the government has
84. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at
1126–27 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[C]ourts
have gradually but deliberately reduced the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to the point at which it scarcely resembles the robust guarantor
of our constitutional rights we knew when I joined the bench.”); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 543 (D. Md. 2011); In re U.S. for Historical
Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d
600 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release
of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
86. See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking
Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 411 (2013); Benjamin M. Ostrander, The
“Mosaic Theory” and Fourth Amendment Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733,
1765 (2011). But see Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss
of Something a Lot Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and
the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 233 (2012)
(concluding that the mosaic theory is unworkable).
87. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
88. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549.
89. Id. at 558.
90. Id. at 561.
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made use of the mosaic theory, warning that “[d]isparate items
of information, though individually of limited or no utility to
their possessor, can take on added significance when combined
91
with other items of information.” Analogizing to this oft-taken
92
FOIA position, the Maynard court found that “[w]hat may
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to
93
one who has a broad view of the scene.” To a greater extent
than when the key Fourth Amendment precedents had been
decided, knowledge of “all of another’s travels can deduce
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, . . . an unfaithful husband, . . . an associate of particular individuals or
political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but
94
all such facts.”
On appeal, though the Supreme Court ultimately decided
95
the case on a “narrower basis,” two Justices penned concurrences indicating approval of the application of the mosaic theory to the Fourth Amendment. Justice Alito, speaking for four
justices, and Justice Sotomayor, writing for herself, believed
“longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
96
impinges on expectations of privacy.” As noted in Part I, other
judges have since followed the lead of Justices Alito and
Sotomayor, applying the mosaic theory to find the third party
doctrine inapplicable and upholding an expectation of privacy
even in situations where information was somehow no longer
97
privately held.
91. Bethany L. Dickman, Note, Untying Knotts: The Application of Mosaic
Theory to GPS Surveillance in United States v. Maynard, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
731, 736 (2011) (quoting David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005)).
92. See Anna-Karina Parker, Dragnet Law Enforcement: Prolonged Surveillance & the Fourth Amendment, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 23, 32 n.20 (2011);
Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a “Mosaic Theory” of Government Searches, CATO INST. (Aug. 11, 2010, 9:22 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/gps
-tracking-mosaic-theory-government-searches (“The theory holds that pieces of
information that are not in themselves sensitive . . . can nevertheless be withheld, because in combination . . . [they] permit the inference of facts that are
sensitive . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
93. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178
(1985)).
94. Id. at 562.
95. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia relied upon the physical trespass of the tracking device onto Jones’s car, arguing that the trespassory theory of the Fourth Amendment had survived the decision in Katz. Id. at 949–51
(majority opinion).
96. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
97. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013) (cit-
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While the mosaic theory has intuitive appeal—that the accumulation of vast amounts of information can pose a threat to
privacy greater than the sum of its parts—it works better as a
metaphor than as a constitutional doctrine. Despite the evocative imagery, the mosaic theory faces a significant hurdle due
to its impracticality as an administrable standard for both law
enforcement and courts. At what point does any unit of information interact with other data to form the recognizable mosaic? The mosaic theory complicates “all of the problems of line
drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to ap98
ply the Fourth Amendment.”
The most obvious problem with such an approach is determining what amount of information constitutes a mosaic as op99
posed to a scattered collection of tiles. Justice Alito recognized
this pitfall when he noted that the Court “need not identify
with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle
became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4100
week mark.” Line drawing problems are presented, however,
not only in the duration and scope of investigation, but also in
determining which investigative techniques add to the mosaic
and how investigations should be grouped across officers, de101
partments, or sovereigns. While many have taken up the
102
mantle of the mosaic theory, no one has advanced satisfying
103
answers to these difficult line-drawing questions.
ing Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63) (“Records that once would have revealed a
few scattered tiles of information about a person now reveal an entire mosaic—a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person’s life.”), vacated,
800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But see ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724,
752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (reaching the opposite conclusion on nearly identical
facts), vacated, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
98. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 147 (1978).
99. See Walsh, supra note 86, at 236–37.
100. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 333–36 (2012).
102. See, e.g., Dickman, supra note 91; Parker, supra note 92, at 32; Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS
Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 177, 201 (2011); Erin Smith Dennis,
Note, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights
in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 770–71 (2011); Justin P. Webb,
Note, Car-ving Out Notions of Privacy: The Impact of GPS Tracking and Why
Maynard Is a Move in the Right Direction, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 788–96
(2012).
103. Kerr, supra note 101, at 346 (“I find it particularly telling that not
even the proponents of the mosaic theory have proposed answers for how the
theory should apply.” (citing Smith et al., supra note 102)); see also Brief of
Yale Law School Information Society Project Scholars and Other Experts in
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Yet even if a standard could be reasonably set, the mosaic
theory is further flawed because of its continued reliance on a
search/nonsearch distinction. Under the theory, aggregation of
data amounting to a mosaic constitutes a search subject to the
full warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, but only slightly fewer data points entirely evade
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Such a wide gap between outcomes separated by so little additional aggregation will lead to
arbitrary and inconsistent results. To make matters worse, the
threshold between search and nonsearch may not be apparent
to either the individual under surveillance or to law enforcement compiling the final piece of the puzzle. This means that
neither the citizen nor the police officer knows where the
boundary lines are ex ante in terms of conduct, but only ex post
in terms of results.
B. CATEGORIZATION
In search of a solution to the third party doctrine problem,
other authors have taken to categorization as a means of artic104
ulating coherent Fourth Amendment principles. The critical
benefit of such an approach is to give clearer ex ante commands
than would be possible under the mosaic approach. In turn,
this puts great pressure on the ability to draw lines around certain forms of communication or conduct that can be subject to a
clearer regulatory approach. The categorization strategy therefore typically identifies a special category for exemption, relies
on empirical studies, or creates a totally new scheme.
One strategy is to identify certain categories of information
particularly well suited for exemption from the current third
party doctrine; these categories typically are identified in the
digital sphere and thus sit on the forefront of technological
change. Social networking data is one particularly compelling
105
category. Arguments in favor of heightened protections for
the Law of Privacy and Technology as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
25–27, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 4614429, at *25–27.
104. See Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 309 (2003) (noting that although there “exists
among privacy scholars a general consensus that privacy law and theory must
change to meet the needs of the digital age,” no agreement on achieving that
goal has appeared).
105. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the
Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 27 (2013); Saby
Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party
Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 67–68 (2011);
Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L.
REV. 227, 247 (2012); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and
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social networks proceed both from a Fourth Amendment basis—arguing that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
106
privacy in social networking data —and from a First Amendment basis—arguing that protections are needed lest law en107
forcement activity chill novel digital communication. As social
relationships and interactions increasingly extend into cyberspace, scholars argue, courts should extend the protections typically afforded to such interactions when they occur in the ana108
log world. As one scholar puts it, putting information on the
Internet does not make it any less private because “life in the
109
twenty-first century occurs in cyberspace.”
Yet identifying which data constitute social networking information can prove difficult. Different theories such as “inter110
111
personal privacy,” “technosocial extension,” and “[f]reedom
112
of [a]ssociation [f]ramework” attempt to draw lines between
less important digital communication, which the police are free
to intercept, and data requiring protection. For example, one
scholar attempts to differentiate a permissible law enforcement
sting in a public chat room from a police officer’s “friending” a
suspect on Facebook with a fake account, because the former is
113
more similar to interactions that occur in a public space. Yet
both appear to contain an element of voluntary disclosure or
waiver, making it difficult to cleanly identify one as more pub114
lic than the other. Even if the line could be drawn, what
Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L.
REV. 614, 675 (2011).
106. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 105, at 239.
107. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49
B.C. L. REV. 741, 795 (2008); see also id. at 751 (“For these emergent associations, and even for traditional associations that make extensive use of digital
communications, the potential chilling effects of relational surveillance are
profound.”).
108. See Strandburg, supra note 105.
109. Ghoshray, supra note 105, at 67.
110. Bedi, supra note 105, at 59 (advocating the protection of Facebook
friendships because they maintain the same aspects of “interpersonal privacy”
as offline relationships).
111. Strandburg, supra note 105, at 664 (defining social networks as “a
technosocial extension of the home or office”).
112. Strandburg, supra note 107 (advocating for judges to “view the Fourth
Amendment through a special First Amendment lens in cases implicating expressive activity”); see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 163 (2007) (suggesting that the First
Amendment can provide an independent means for protecting third party information from government investigation).
113. See Strandburg, supra note 105, at 671–75.
114. See Bedi, supra note 105, at 28 (“It is not clear why these types of dis-
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about activity that falls between the two, such as gaining access to a members-only message board?
Categorization based on empirical studies is another strategy for updating the third party doctrine. Advocates of this
strategy utilize survey data to test the public’s reasonable ex115
pectation of privacy in various areas. Professor Christopher
Slobogin has conducted the most comprehensive such study, attempting to measure the public’s perception of the level of in116
trusiveness of different government interventions. Slobogin
uses these data to inform his longstanding proportionality proposal for the Fourth Amendment, in which different levels of
117
protection shield various categories of information. Under
this theory, the more intrusive the public regards a police tactic, the greater protection the third party information implicat118
ed receives. Thus, records about a corporation would require
a subpoena supported by the relevance standard, whereas publicly held personal records could be accessed with a “Terry Or-

closures do not stand or fall together . . . .”).
115. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That
What Katz Is Made of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 829 (2008) (advocating for
use of empirical data in future Fourth Amendment decisions); Tokson, supra
note 50, at 622–27; Sonia K. McNeil, Note, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 215 (2011) (“[T]he Court’s interpretation of the thirdparty doctrine has fallen out of step with the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the
people whom the Fourth Amendment protects. Empirical evidence offers one
way to resolve the dissonance between the Court’s opinion and public opinion.”); see also Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 46–49 (2011) (using Tokson’s survey).
116. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical
Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J.
727, 728 (1993) (examining an extensive survey in which 217 subjects were
presented with questions intending to determine their perception of intrusiveness in response to fifty scenarios).
117. Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of
the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1082 (1998). Though
Professor Slobogin identifies Terry v. Ohio as valuable inspiration for a reexamination of the third party doctrine, he focuses on the proportionality principles instead of the usefulness of the Court’s one-time balancing. Compare id.
at 1056–57 (“This relaxation of the probable cause standard can be, and largely was, justified on proportionality grounds . . . .”), with infra Part IV (advocating for an evaluation of reasonableness in third party searches).
118. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 116, at 757–58 (“Under proportionality analysis, rankings [of search intrusiveness] . . . would serve as a useful device for determining how much ‘probable cause’ is necessary to conduct a
particular search or seizure.”).
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der,” in effect a warrant supported by reasonable suspicion ra119
ther than probable cause.
The proportionality model, however, suffers from two major shortcomings: unreliable data and rigidity. First, surveys
are a poor way to measure expectations of privacy. Not only are
120
121
surveys difficult to administer, quickly out of date, and
122
highly sensitive to slight variations in phrasing, but also re123
Of course,
spondents tend to overstate privacy interests.
courts can ascribe different degrees of protection based upon
sensitivity without recourse to survey data. Professor Orin Kerr
has noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court has taken this
approach, “appl[ying] a balancing test that considers ‘the type
of protection’ that should be afforded ‘in the face of legitimate
investigative needs’ that ‘will arise [and] justify State intrusion
124
upon that interest.’” Yet while such proportional approaches
at first appear quite flexible, their reliance on categorization
125
breeds rigid and potentially arbitrary line-drawing. While
Slobogin has added a “quasi-private” category to his initial distinction between publicly and privately held records, for exam126
ple, one cannot envy the jurist forced to distinguish private
records from quasi-private records, and quasi-private records
from public records, in an endless series of technologically
evolving iterations.

119. Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75
MISS. L.J. 139, 169 (2005).
120. Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116
PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 320–21 (2011) (“Yet administering such surveys would
be a very difficult, perhaps near-impossible task.”).
121. Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 951, 964–65 (2009) (“[W]hat if public opinion changes over time—should
the courts change the rule when public opinion changes, such as after a terrorist attack or the release of an influential movie about surveillance?”).
122. Id. at 964 (“Survey responses can be highly sensitive to the audience,
to the phrasing of the question, and to the timing of the survey.”).
123. Daniel J. Solove, Essay, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L.
REV. 1511, 1522–24 (2010) (outlining academic research indicating survey respondents overstate privacy interests when compared to their revealed preferences, as the same individuals willingly give up privacy for small benefits).
124. See Kerr, supra note 121, at 965 (latter alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 35 (N.J. 2008); State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866,
875 (N.J. 2005)).
125. See id. at 964 (“Slobogin’s approach also appears unnecessarily complicated.”).
126. Compare SLOBOGIN, supra note 54 (containing an updated chart with
more categories), with Slobogin, supra note 119 (using a chart to demonstrate
proposed categories).
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Most ambitiously, a final strategy attempts to completely
reframe the protective scheme for third party material through
categorization. In one well-thought-out example, Professor
Daniel Solove attempts to “[r]econstruct[] the [a]rchitecture” by
drawing a new line in the sand for the protection of third party
127
material. He proposes borrowing from the Privacy Act, disallowing the government from obtaining without legal process
any “system of records,” defined as “a group of any records . . .
from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
128
particular assigned to the individual.” This distinction, he
claims, separates information obtained coercively by the private sector or hospitals from that given freely to friends and
129
neighbors. But if the third party doctrine as it currently exists is overly lenient toward the government, restricting access
130
to any system of records is likely too burdensome.
Ultimately, the categorical approach has not yielded a satisfactory solution. Third party information may once have been
susceptible to categorization, but as the types of information
trusted to third parties proliferate and the need to divulge in131
formation to a variety of actors becomes unavoidable, such an
endeavor becomes increasingly Sisyphean. The source of
categorization’s demise may stem from its reliance on brightline rules—long thought to be incompatible with the Fourth
132
Amendment. Judicially created rules have many pitfalls, in133
cluding their preemption of legislative alternatives; but it is
bright-line rules’ inflexibility that most plagues categoriza127. Solove, supra note 67, at 1151.
128. SOLOVE, supra note 57, at 214 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(5) (2012)).
129. See id. at 216 (“Currently, employers and landlords have a substantial
amount of power to extort personal information.”).
130. See Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment:
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 1019 (2007) (“Solove’s solution is overinclusive. It would require probable cause before the police could obtain everything from basic subscriber information to the most personal of records.” (footnote omitted)).
131. SOLOVE, supra note 57, at 216 (“[P]eople . . . have little choice but to
hand over information to third parties. Life in the Information Age depends
upon sharing information with a host of third party companies.”).
132. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 230 (1984) (describing Professor Wayne
LaFave’s longstanding opposition to bright line rules in the Fourth Amendment context).
133. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to
grapple with these emerging issues rather than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitutional constraints.”).
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134

tion. In the ever-evolving and expanding world of digital in135
formation, the inflexibility of bright-line rules will lead inevi136
tably to difficulties in administration. Under such a system,
judges would be left with the unenviable task of creating new
categories—further complicating an already complex scheme—
or making unjust decisions, potentially damaging the court’s
137
credibility.
C. BALANCING
A third approach for rethinking the third party doctrine relies on a single inquiry into reasonableness. Most famously,
Professor Akhil Amar argues that the Fourth Amendment’s
Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses are disjunctive, and
138
should be read without reference to one another. Thus, investigatory tactics should be evaluated not with reference to probable cause or the existence of a warrant, but only with regard
139
to the reasonableness of law enforcement action. Reasonableness being a broad inquiry, Amar outlines the potential process
through which judges could look for reasonableness: “Common
sense tells us to look beyond probability to the importance of
finding what the government is looking for, the intrusiveness of
the search, the identity of the search target, the availability of
other means of achieving the purpose of the search, and so
140
on.” Fourth Amendment decision-making, then, requires bal134. See Joshua S. Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy
and Technological Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 502, 517 (2011) (cataloguing
the pitfalls of bright line rules for the Fourth Amendment).
135. See, e.g., Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls?:
Call Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
381, 381–82 (2003) (describing how cell phone data—shared with cellular providers—is rapidly expanding and easily accessed).
136. See Levy, supra note 134 (“[C]ourts should only adopt bright-line rules
for activities that are recurring in nature, clearly understandable, and affected
by rapid technological changes.”).
137. Id. (“Incorrect or unjust results risk severely damaging the institutional credibility of the judiciary.”).
138. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 757, 761 (1994) (“The words of the Fourth Amendment really do mean
what they say. They do not require warrants, even presumptively, for searches
and seizures. They do not require probable cause for all searches and seizures
without warrants.”). Amar relies on colonial-era cases to argue that the Warrant Clause, along with the probable cause requirement, was merely intended
to address the founders’ fears of general warrants. Id. at 772 (citing Wilkes v.
Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153).
139. See id. at 801 (“The core of the Fourth Amendment, as we have seen,
is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness.”).
140. Id. Amar goes on to note how law enforcement tactics’ reasonableness
can be greatly affected by implication of some other protected constitutional
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ancing all interests—from the perspective of the community—
141
to determine a search’s reasonability.
While Amar is right that the Supreme Court long ago rejected such a freewheeling inquiry for all Fourth Amendment
142
questions, at times the Court has looked to reasonableness to
guide its jurisprudence. A prime example is the “special needs
143
doctrine,” applicable in “exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica144
145
ble.” In such a situation, courts use a balancing test to
146
evaluate the reasonableness of the proposed activity. This
balancing measures the government’s intrusion on Fourth
Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate gov147
ernmental interests. The Supreme Court identified three factors for evaluation: “(1) ‘the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the [challenged governmental
conduct],’ (2) ‘the character of the intrusion imposed by the
[challenged conduct],’ and (3) ‘the nature and immediacy of the
[state’s] concerns and the efficacy of the [governmental con148
duct] in meeting them.’”
Close examination of the special needs doctrine reveals the
difficulties with applying Amar’s uniform reasonability test to
third party material. Beyond the typical criticisms of balancing
149
tests such as their susceptibility to judicial policymaking,
right. Id. at 804–11. He terms this modification of the inquiry “constitutional
reasonableness.” Id. at 804.
141. See id. at 780–82 (explaining that juries, whose opinions reflect the
community, are the proper vehicle for the weighing of interests).
142. Id. at 757, 761 (referring to Fourth Amendment doctrine as an “embarrassment” and a “mess” for its failure to seize on a simpler framework).
143. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 10 (5th ed.
2012) (describing inspections and administrative searches); Antoine McNamara, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
209, 212–21 (2007) (offering an overview of special needs jurisprudence).
144. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (approving
suspicionless drug testing for high school students who participate in extracurricular activities).
146. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (“The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires ‘balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails.’” (quoting Camara v.
Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)).
147. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995)
(quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
148. Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 832, 834).
149. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107
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pure reasonability is impractical outside special needs cases.
The difficulty once again is in crafting a doctrine that can guide
ex ante behavior by law enforcement. When addressing constitutional challenges to specific governmental initiatives in the
special needs context—whether searches of school lockers for
150
drugs or roadblocks of motorists for driving under the influ151
ence —the Court can step back to examine a government program in its entirety before identifying and weighing interests.
Asking law enforcement officers to make the same judgments
152
before seeking each phone record defies reality. These concerns led to the Court’s recognition that “a responsible Fourth
Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring
sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest
every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an
153
As Professor Anthony
occasion for constitutional review.”
Amsterdam recognized, relying on reasonableness alone “converts the fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach
154
blot.”
The problem with Amar’s framework, however, is not the
recourse to the Reasonableness Clause, but the particular application of the clause. In the next Part we argue that, even
within the Fourth Amendment’s current framework (which by
default conflates reasonableness with a warrant), third party
searches fit comfortably within the category of searches analyzed under the Reasonableness Clause. And in Part IV, we go
on to demonstrate a workable model for applying this clause to
third party searches.
III. THIRD PARTY SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT’S TWO CLAUSES
As noted in Part I, five justices of the Supreme Court appear to have recognized that third party searches cannot be
categorically excluded from the ambit of the Fourth AmendHARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994) (criticizing Amar’s “reasonableness” approach
because it is similar to “rational basis” review, which has proven to be no scrutiny at all).
150. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328–29.
151. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1990).
152. See Wayne B. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (describing the need for Fourth Amendment law to be “readily applicable by the
police”).
153. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
154. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393 (1974).
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ment. At the same time, there is widespread (though hardly
unanimous) scholarly agreement that the third party doctrine
can neither be maintained in its current absolute form nor
155
scrapped entirely. But even those courts willing to rethink
the third party doctrine have fallen into the pattern of treating
the question as one of an on/off switch. These courts focus almost entirely on whether the Fourth Amendment should come
into play at all—i.e., whether an investigatory technique is a
search or not—rather than the extent to which the Fourth
156
Amendment should come into play. The operational assumption is that if the Fourth Amendment applies, the challenged
practice must adhere to the probable cause and warrant requirements—a Fourth Amendment variant of the “‘strict’ in
theory and fatal in fact” standard of review under the Equal
157
Protection Clause. But the Fourth Amendment, after all, contains not one but two clauses: the Warrant Clause and the Rea158
sonableness Clause. Instead of continuing to chafe against
the ill-fitting mantle of the search/nonsearch distinction, courts
should recognize third party searches as another of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and accordingly craft a reasonableness test to gauge when third party searches are consti159
tutionally appropriate.
In this Part, we first provide an overview of the Warrant
Clause exceptions that have been recognized by the Court,
drawing out their key features. We then examine the third party doctrine, demonstrating its doctrinal fit among these exceptions. Finally, we argue that the probable cause requirement of
the Warrant Clause should not attach by default to third party
searches, which should instead be governed by the Reasonableness Clause.
A. THE WARRANT EXCEPTIONS
The Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions
to the warrant requirement. These exceptions carry a variety of
different rationales—some, such the arrest exceptions, stem
155. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) (“Some situations evoked the aggressive ‘new’ equal protection, with
scrutiny that was ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential ‘old’ equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and
virtually none in fact.”).
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
159. See infra Part IV.C.
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from the impracticability of obtaining a warrant, while others, such as the vehicular search exceptions, involve diminished
161
expectation of privacy or limited scope of intrusion. Generally
speaking, however, the exceptions can be grouped into three
162
categories. First, there are a handful of exceptions that dispense with the warrant requirement for reasons of necessity or
historical practice but maintain the probable cause standard
unaltered. Second, there are certain narrowly drawn contexts
in which the Court will dispense with individualized suspicion
altogether, generally in the context of border searches or programmatic searches. And third, the Court has carved out and
slowly expanded an intermediate category where officers may
conduct a search or seizure based upon reasonable suspicion
rather than probable cause.
1. Probable Cause Without Warrants
The Supreme Court has held that in limited circumstances,
officers may take action implicating the Fourth Amendment
without a warrant, subject to the action satisfying a probable

160. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (stating that requiring a warrant prior to arrest is an “intolerable handicap for legitimate law
enforcement”).
161. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (“The public is
fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this
compelling governmental need for regulation.”); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (“[L]ess rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.”).
162. Some sources identify three additional types of warrantless searches
and seizures: plain view seizures, consent searches, and searches and seizures
of abandoned property. See, e.g., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 42 GEO.
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 46, 80–84, 96–112, 150–51 (2013). Plain view
seizures rest upon the principle that an incriminating item discovered during
the course of legitimate police activity—whether a search or not a search—
may be seized without a warrant. E.g., id. at 80–82. As the Court noted in
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738–39 (1983), “‘[p]lain view’ is perhaps better
understood, therefore, not as an independent ‘exception’ to the Warrant
Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an
officer’s ‘access to an object’ may be.” Consent searches, meanwhile, constitute
a waiver of the Fourth Amendment’s applicability entirely, see Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947), albeit a waiver
confined to a reasonable understanding of the waiver’s scope, see Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51 (1991). Similarly, one who has abandoned property has relinquished a Fourth Amendment interest in it. See Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There can be nothing unlawful in the Government’s appropriation of . . . abandoned property.”
(citation omitted)). As such, we do not consider these types of searches and
seizures as separate exceptions to the warrant requirement here.
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163

cause standard. First, the Court has stated that a warrantless arrest can occur where “officers have probable cause to be164
lieve that a person has committed a crime in their presence.”
The Court has not spent a great deal of time justifying this exception, but has noted at various points that warrantless ar165
rests were “‘taken for granted’ at the founding,” and that a
warrant requirement for arrests for crimes committed in front
of officers would constitute an “intolerable handicap for legiti166
mate law enforcement.”
Second, it is a “settled rule that warrantless arrests in pub167
lic places are valid” where supported by probable cause,
though there has been even less effort put into justifying this
result (a point Amar has seized upon to cast doubt upon the
168
general applicability of the warrant requirement ). Most cases
169
trace the rule back to Carroll v. United States, which offered
merely that “the reason for arrest without warrant on a reliable
report of a felony was because the public safety and the due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses required
170
that such arrests should be made at once without warrant.”
The Court appears to balance this public safety need against
the interest in the sanctity of the home protected by the Fourth
Amendment, thus finding that arrests upon probable cause require a warrant within the home but do not require a warrant
171
in public.
Third, the Court has sanctioned dispensing with the warrant requirement for searches and seizures in exigent circum172
stances. For exigent circumstances to excuse the need for a
warrant, the Court has made clear that “police officers need . . .

163. See Pugh, 420 U.S. at 120 (“The standard is the same as that for arrest.”).
164. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 170 (majority opinion) (citing TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 45 (1969)).
166. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 113.
167. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980).
168. Amar, supra note 138, at 764.
169. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
170. Id. at 157.
171. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586–87 (“[S]earches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable . . . [but] objects such as
weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police
without a warrant.”).
172. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (stating that
officers usually require warrants unless exigent circumstances override
Fourth Amendment concerns).
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probable cause plus exigent circumstances.” The Court has
identified a variety of “exigencies of the situation [that] make
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amend174
ment,” including the need to render emergency aid, hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and the danger of destruction of
175
evidence.
The final context in which the Court has allowed warrantless action while maintaining the probable cause requirement
176
is for searches of vehicles. The Court initially rested this
waiver of the warrant requirement upon the portable nature of
automobiles and the risk that evidence would move beyond the
officer’s control or jurisdiction before a warrant could be ob177
tained. However, the Court has made clear that “[b]esides the
element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern
because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or
178
And in fact, the Court has “upheld warrantless
office.”
searches where no immediate danger was presented that the
179
car would be removed from the jurisdiction,” including after
180
the vehicle has already been impounded. In these cases, it
would appear that the lesser expectation of privacy provides an
independently sufficient justification to dispense with the warrant requirement.
2. Searches Without Individualized Suspicion
Several warrant exceptions dealing with searches in “ex181
circumstances dispense with the individualized
ceptional”
173. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (allowing officers to enter
a home under exigent circumstances).
174. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394.
175. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459–60 (2011). One wrinkle, orthogonal to this discussion, is that the officers need only “an objectively reasonable
basis for believing” that the exigent circumstance at issue exists. Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006).
176. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1985) (holding that a
warrantless vehicular search was not unreasonable because the officers had
probable cause).
177. See id. at 390–91.
178. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
179. Id.
180. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 & n.10 (1970) (finding no difference under the Fourth Amendment between searching a vehicle immediately and searching it after impoundment).
181. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has recognized certain exceptional circumstances
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suspicion requirement altogether. First, the border has long
been held to a different standard, operating on a sliding scale of
suspicion needed to justify increasingly obtrusive searches. For
example, routine stops at fixed border points may be conducted
182
without any individualized suspicion, while detention beyond
183
the scope of routine inspection requires reasonable suspicion.
The Court justified these practices by noting that “not only is
the expectation of privacy less at the border than in the interior, [but] the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests
of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is also struck much more favorably to the Government at the bor184
der.”
Another well-established exception to the Warrant Clause
is searches incident to arrest. “The exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typi185
cally implicated in arrest situations.” Where the police make
a valid arrest, they are permitted to search “the person of the
186
arrestee . . . [and] the area within the control of the arrestee.”
Both types of searches must be reasonable in scope (and have
187
been the subject of considerable contestation over scope), but
188
individualized suspicion is not required. Similarly, upon taking property into custody, the police may inventory it according
to standardized procedures without any individualized suspi189
cion. As discussed above, the scope of the search-incident-toarrest exception has recently been constricted by Riley v. Caliunder which warrant and probable-cause requirements are impracticable).
182. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
183. Id. at 541.
184. Id. at 539–40 (citations omitted). A similar scheme prevails with regard to Coast Guard inspections at sea. See United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 462 U.S. 579, 591 (1983) (observing that the government’s interests
in regulating sea traffic are more substantial at checkpoints where vessels depart to foreign ports).
185. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
186. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
187. See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 (surveying the turbulent legal history
of searches of vehicles pursuant to arrest of an occupant); Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding it unreasonable to surgically extract a bullet). To
many observers, Gant further threw into confusion the permissible scope of a
search incident to arrest as it pertains to vehicle occupants. See, e.g., George
M. Dery III, A Case of Doubtful Certainty: The Court Relapses into Search Incident to Arrest Confusion in Arizona v. Gant, 44 IND. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011)
(“Gant . . . may lead to further confusion in this troubled area of Fourth
Amendment litigation.”).
188. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35.
189. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1987).
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190

fornia, but outside of cellphones and perhaps other electronic
191
devices the core features of the exception remain intact.
A final category falls under the catch-all of “special needs,”
also examined in Part II. The Court has held that “[i]n limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by
a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be rea192
sonable despite the absence of such suspicion.” The governmental interest must go “beyond the normal need for law en193
forcement . . . .” Accordingly, the Court has upheld mandatory
194
drug tests in some contexts, such as for high school athletes,
195
but not in others, such as for pregnant mothers. One variant
of such special needs searches are administrative searches of
196
“pervasively regulated industries.” In such cases, where “the
privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened,” the government can craft a regulatory
scheme that dispenses with warrants and with individualized
197
suspicion.
3. Searches and Seizures upon Reasonable Suspicion
The final category of exceptions to the Warrant Clause involves a pure application of the Fourth Amendment’s second
clause: that searches and seizures must be reasonable. In Terry
198
v. Ohio, to be explored in more depth in Part IV, the Court
permitted officers to make investigatory stops of persons on the
basis of reasonable suspicion without a warrant. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Warren focused on three primary
rationales for allowing the police to proceed without a warrant.
First, it is simply impracticable (if not impossible) for the police
to obtain a warrant at every investigatory encounter on the
street. The Court found that such “police conduct—necessarily
190. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (declining to extend Robinson to an arrestee’s cellphone).
191. Id. at 2493–94 (stating that the Court’s exception for cellphones did
not otherwise disturb the doctrine).
192. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
193. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
194. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–66 (1995).
195. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76–86 (2001).
196. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987).
197. Id. at 702.
198. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat—. . . historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant proce199
dure.” Second, there is an important “need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective vicvictims of violence in situations where they may lack probable
200
cause for an arrest.” And third, “[a]n arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited
201
search for weapons . . . .” Whereas an arrest involves significant infringement upon personal liberty, a Terry stop “constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon
202
the sanctity of the person.” Weighing these three factors, the
Court’s “evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck
in this type of case” led it to conclude that police should possess
a narrowly drawn stop-and-frisk authority without a warrant
203
requirement and upon reasonable suspicion.
Two rationales that the Court declined to pursue in Terry
are worth noting. First was the Ohio Court of Appeals’ suggestion that a “stop and frisk” should be excluded from the definition of search or seizure entirely, and thus moved outside the
204
purview of the Fourth Amendment. Second, the majority did
not adopt Justice Douglas’s exhortation in dissent that the
Court retain the probable cause standard despite discarding
205
the warrant requirement. The majority’s “evaluation of the
proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case” led it,
206
instead, to the reasonable suspicion standard.
207
In United States v. Place, the Court considered whether
to extend the reasoning of Terry to the detention of luggage at
airports. The Court held that “seizures on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the
luggage contains contraband or evidence of a crime” were valid
208
under the Fourth Amendment. Following the formula laid
down by Terry, the Court “balance[d] the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
199. Id. at 20.
200. Id. at 24.
201. Id. at 26.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 27.
204. See id. at 16–20, 16 n.12 (citing State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120
(Ohio 1966)).
205. See id. at 35–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 27 (majority opinion).
207. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
208. Id. at 702.
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against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
209
justify the intrusion.” As in Terry, the Court pointed to the
government’s interest in detecting and preventing crime; in
Place, however, the Court lacked (and found unnecessary) the
210
officer safety rationale upon which Terry had, in part, rested.
The Court also noted “the inherently transient nature of drug
courier activity at airports,” and rejected the respondents’ argument that “a generalized interest in law enforcement” could
not “justify an intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment
211
interests in the absence of probable cause.” Set against these
governmental interests, the Court found that “[t]he intrusion
on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one’s person212
al effects can vary both in its nature and extent.” Where the
detention was only temporary and the examination of the property did not independently violate the Fourth Amendment, de213
tention on reasonable suspicion would be valid.
4. Common Themes
A handful of common themes emerge from these scattered
warrant exceptions: the practicality of obtaining a warrant,
whether there is a diminished expectation of privacy, and the
significance of the law enforcement interest. The first, distinctly not applicable to run-of-the-mill third party searches, is that
of the practical impossibility of the interposition of a magistrate
between officer and search. There is little risk that data or documents held by third parties will drive off into the sunset before the officer can secure a warrant, as with vehicles, or that a
suspect will destroy them or use them for violence against officers, as with searches incident to arrest.
But practical impossibility is not a necessary condition for
warrantless searches; significant as well is the privacy interest
at stake. As noted above, the Court has found a diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles sufficient to justify dispensing
with the warrant requirement even where mobility concerns

209. Id. at 703.
210. Id. at 703–04.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 705. Interestingly, the Court offered an example of a situation in
which expectations of privacy could be diminished: “[t]he seizure may be made
after the owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party or, as
here, from the immediate custody and control of the owner.” Id. (emphasis
added).
213. The Court held in Place that the ninety-minute detention exceeded the
permissible scope of a Terry stop. Id. at 709–10.
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214

are obviated. The exception for administrative searches of
closely regulated industries does not depend upon the impossibility of obtaining prior approval, but rather upon the owner’s
215
And in other contexts
diminished expectation of privacy.
where practicality is at play, such as Terry stops and border
searches, the Court has been careful to note as well a diminished expectation of privacy where it has abandoned the warrant requirement (and particularly where it has lowered the
216
probable cause threshold).
In addition to the degree of expectation of privacy, the
Court has often looked to the countervailing government interest. In the context of special needs, the Court has stated that
the government interest must be distinct from (though not nec217
essarily to the exclusion of) ordinary law enforcement. But
this is not a general rule: in extending Terry stops to luggage,
the Court in Place rejected the proposition that, “absent some
special law enforcement interest such as officer safety, a generalized interest in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion
on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests in the absence
218
of probable cause.”
B. SHOULD THIRD PARTY SEARCHES REQUIRE A WARRANT?
Looking to the factors the Court has highlighted as favoring an exception from the warrant requirement, the most salient for third party searches are law enforcement needs and a
reduced expectation of privacy. As noted above, third party
searches could, in circumstances not covered independently by
the exigent circumstances exception, be preapproved by a neutral magistrate. But as the Court said in United States v.

214. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (discussing
the traditional distinction between automobiles and homes or offices in the
context of the Fourth Amendment).
215. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (recognizing the
lessened application of warrant and probable cause requirements in the context of a closely regulated industry).
216. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985)
(identifying the lessened expectation of privacy at the border compared to the
interior); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (rejecting the argument that an
officer is unjustified in making an intrusion short of an arrest absent evidence
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a
crime).
217. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court uses a balancing test only in the context of “a
special law enforcement need for greater flexibility”).
218. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703–04 (1983).
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219

Rabinowitz, “[a] rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this requirement should be crystallized into a
220
sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search.” The constitutional imposition of a warrant requirement would both overprotect information in which individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy and unduly hamper law enforcement interests.
1. Diminished Expectation of Privacy
In addition to the significant government interest in access
to third party records, the Court has repeatedly recognized a
221
diminished expectation of privacy in such records. Of course,
the Court’s declaration, that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
222
third parties,” has been roundly condemned. But even if a
person does not entirely lack a legitimate expectation in privacy, it does not necessarily follow that her expectation of privacy
is not at all diminished. Accepting that there are diminished—
but not nonexistent—expectations of privacy in third party records would, unlike the approach of Miller and Smith, render
the Fourth Amendment applicable to such searches. As the
Court noted in Riley, “[t]he fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amend223
ment falls out of the picture entirely.”
It is widely recognized that individuals cannot, or should
not, actually expect all of the information disclosed to third
parties to remain private. Justice Alito, concurring in Jones,
acknowledged that “even if the public does not welcome the
diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may
eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevita224
ble.” But what are we to make of this inevitability? The Miller Court implicitly analogized this potential exposure to the
common law doctrine of assumption of risk: a “depositor takes
219. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
220. Id. at 65.
221. Cf. Place, 462 U.S. at 705 (“The intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one’s personal effects can vary both in its nature and extent. The seizure may be made after the owner has relinquished control of the
property to a third party . . . .”).
222. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (emphasis added).
223. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014).
224. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the infor225
mation will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”
Kerr has picked up on this notion of assumption of risk to argue
that the depositor (or other person engaging in transactions
with third parties) has voluntarily consented to the disclo226
sure.
Epstein has powerfully critiqued the idea that knowledge of
risk is analytically equivalent to assumption of risk in this context because individuals cannot contract out of it: “The supposed assumption of the risk is forced on individuals by positive
227
law. It is not consensually assumed.” Such an approach finds
228
some support in Georgia v. Randolph, in which the Court refused to recognize a co-occupant’s consent to search an apart229
ment where the physically present defendant refused entry.
The Randolph majority critiqued “the dissent’s easy assumption that privacy shared with another individual is privacy
waived for all purposes including warrantless searches by the
230
Defenders of the traditional third party doctrine
police.”
might respond that an individual could simply decline to contract with third parties whenever they seek to keep given information private, but such an option may never have been
231
232
practical, and certainly is even less so in the modern world.
And indeed, the Katz majority would likely find quite alien the
notion that pervasive electronic surveillance, if carried out
through third parties, could be justified under the rubric of
233
consent.
So where does this leave us? According to Kerr and the
Miller and Smith Courts, one’s knowledge that she is turning
225. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
226. Kerr, supra note 2, at 588–90.
227. Epstein, supra note 64, at 1206.
228. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
229. Id. at 122–23.
230. Id. at 115 n.4.
231. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.”).
232. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties . . . is ill suited
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”).
233. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to
which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements, but of
course ‘the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to
the suspect.’” (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946))).
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over her information to third parties—and potentially to the
government—would defeat her reasonable expectation of priva234
cy under the Katz test. Yet according to Epstein, the Randolph majority, and the Jones concurrences, such knowledge
should not constitute waiver. Faced with these conflicting supportable positions, it seems clear that people retain a diminished, though not nonexistent, expectation of privacy in information they disclose to third parties.
2. Law Enforcement Needs
The government has a substantial interest in access to information held in the hands of third parties. Of course, the government always has a law enforcement interest in escaping the
strictures of the Warrant Clause. But “[a] generalized interest
in expedient law enforcement cannot, without more, justify a
235
warrantless search.” What the Court asks, in weighing an exception to the warrant requirement, is whether warrants would
236
pose a particular burden in a given situation. In the case of
third party searches, there are good reasons to find that this
heightened law enforcement interest is present.
As Epstein and Slobogin have pointed out, the Fourth
Amendment (and in fact, the entirety of criminal procedure)
operates on a graduated scale: ordinary police work operates
outside the parameters of the Fourth Amendment, minimally
intrusive searches are subject to reasonableness, more invasive
searches and arrest require warrants and probable cause, and
237
conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. This pro234. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
235. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115 n.5. These dicta in Randolph would appear
to coexist uneasily with the Court’s rejection in Place of the “suggest[ion] that,
absent some special law enforcement interest such as officer safety, a generalized interest in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion on an individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of probable cause.” Place, 462
U.S. at 703–04 (1983). In context, however, it is clear that the Place Court intended to place the inquiry on the substantiality, rather than the type, of the
law enforcement interest. See id. at 704 (“The test is whether those interests
are sufficiently ‘substantial,’ not whether they are independent of the interest
in investigating crimes effectively and apprehending suspects.” (quoting
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981))).
236. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“But we deal here with an
entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the
on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not
been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”).
237. Epstein, supra note 64, at 1211 (“The basic pattern is that in principle, it should take more to convict than it does to arrest, and more to arrest
than it does to search, and more to search than it does to investigate.”);
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gression was similarly noted by the Terry Court: “[I]n dealing
with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on
city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible
responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information
238
they possess.”
As argued in Part II, there is increasing recognition that
third party searches—or at least some third party searches—
cannot be located on the lowest rung of that ladder. But it is
equally unrealistic to think that the entire panoply of third
party searches can be subject to the requirements necessary to
effectuate a forcible entry into the home. As Kerr notes, “[t]he
repeated use of nonsearch techniques has been considered an
essential way to create probable cause that justifies searches
239
rather than an unlawful search itself.” To prohibit any access
to third party information would be “devastating to the legiti240
mate needs of law enforcement.” Although law enforcement’s
use of third party information is difficult to quantify, the prac241
tice is widespread and by all accounts extraordinarily effective. As Slobogin points out, the warrant and probable cause
requirements could pose an insurmountable barrier to standard
242
police investigations. He explains:
[I]magine that police want to find out from the phone company who
called a murder victim in the two weeks prior to the murder (a scenario often depicted on TV shows like Law & Order). While they
would certainly be able to demonstrate the relevance of this . . . data,
they would not have probable cause with respect to any of the callers,
and thus would not be able to obtain the regulated subpoena for the
243
phone company’s records . . . .

Lacking the ability to access third party information without a warrant supported by probable cause, police tactics would
revert to the pre-modern era, where officers must resort to prohibitively expensive low-tech surveillance such as knocking on
244
doors or staking out suspected criminals.
Slobogin, supra note 119, at 164–67.
238. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
239. Kerr, supra note 101, at 328.
240. Henderson, supra note 115, at 44.
241. See Dennis, supra note 102, at 757 (“[I]n 2004, federal law enforcement utilized 10,874 pen register and trap and trace orders; by 2008, that
number had almost doubled, to 20,889 orders.”).
242. See Slobogin, supra note 119, at 185.
243. Id.
244. See Blake Ellis Reid, Note, Substitution Effects: A Problematic Justification for the Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 613, 620 (2010) (“Low-tech surveillance, such as
committing officers to stakeouts and tracking work, is expensive—and funding
of boots-on-the-ground police presence seems to be on a problematic decline in
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Furthermore, requiring warrants for third party searches
is even less feasible today than it would have been in the late
1970s, when Smith and Miller were decided. The Court has
signaled its awareness of “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of
245
communication and information transmission,” and Kerr has
noted that such changes “place[] more and more communica246
tions in the hands of third parties.” This change is, of course,
a double-edged sword: the migration of personal transactions
from the analog to the digital sphere heightens both the government interest in access and the individual’s interest in protection. But the government interest is particularly significant
because of the growing threat of cybercrime, which takes place
247
entirely across platforms controlled by third parties. For example, “tracing an IP address is a common and effective way
for authorities to identify perpetrators of cyberharassment
248
crimes.” If drug courier activity at airports is sufficient to de249
prive luggage of the full protection of the Warrant Clause, the
shift of criminal activity to the Internet should similarly push
in favor of a warrant exception for third party searches.
3. Applying the Rationales
If an activity is to be deemed a search but excused from the
250
warrant requirement, a specific exception must be made.
Such a burden is not easily overcome, but the third party doctrine shares two important features with other exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Like the heightened law enforcement
concerns over the border (as in United States v. Montoya de
251
Hernandez ) or drug courier activity at airports (as in United

the United States.”).
245. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).
246. Kerr, supra note 2, at 566.
247. Cf. David Gray et al., Fighting Cybercrime After United States v.
Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 759 (2013) (“[T]he third-party doctrine[] play[s] a critical role in law enforcement’s efforts to detect and prosecute many crimes, particularly cybercrimes.”).
248. Id. at 797.
249. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983) (“Because of the
inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports, allowing police
to make brief investigative stops of persons at airports on reasonable suspicion
of drug-trafficking substantially enhances the likelihood that police will be
able to prevent the flow of narcotics into distribution channels.”).
250. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“In the absence of
a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to
the warrant requirement.”).
251. 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
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252

States v. Place ), third party searches implicate a zone of special law enforcement concern. And as with vehicles (as in Ari253
zona v. Gant ) and closely regulated industries (as in New
254
York v. Burger ), the intrusion on personal privacy is limited
by the diminished expectation of privacy. Given the current
status of third party searches as wholly outside the Fourth
Amendment, defining third party searches as an exception to
the warrant requirement offers a sensible avenue to bring them
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment without dramatically upending law enforcement practice.
C. WARRANTLESS THIRD PARTY SEARCHES: PROBABLE CAUSE
OR REASONABLENESS?
Having determined that the warrant requirement should
not apply to third party searches, the next question is whether
the Warrant Clause’s probable cause standard should apply.
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
255
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

As Professor Amsterdam famously observed, the problem
with interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is that “[i]ts lan256
guage is no help and neither is its history.” The unclear relationship between the two clauses raises the question of whether, if courts are to bring third party searches under the Fourth
Amendment without a warrant requirement, they should impose a probable cause requirement. There are two competing
views on this question, among both jurists and academics, but
the more appropriate path for third party searches is to adopt
the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment’s first
clause, rather than the probable cause standard of its second
clause.
One view, espoused prominently by Professor Amar, is that
the two clauses are disjunctive: searches are generally to be
governed by the Reasonableness Clause, and only those partic252. 462 U.S. at 704.
253. 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (describing the Court’s precedents allowing
vehicle searches in the course of arresting suspects).
254. 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987) (referring to “the exception to the warrant
requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries”).
255. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
256. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 395.
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ular circumstances in which warrants are required are to be
governed by the probable cause and specificity requirements of
257
the Warrant Clause. As Professor Tracey Maclin has noted,
this view had early adherents among the Court prior to the
258
Warren Court’s procedural revolution. In 1950, the Court
stated: “It is unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. It was recognized by the framers of the
Constitution that there were reasonable searches for which no
259
warrant was required.”
This view appeared to fall out of favor over the following
decades in favor of the conjunctive reading of the two clauses:
that the Reasonableness Clause, in most cases, incorporates
the warrant and probable cause requirements of the second
260
clause. In Katz, the Court stated that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well261
delineated exceptions.” According to Maclin, this view continued to prevail through the 1970s, with some dissenting voices
262
urging a return to the disjunctive model.
263
But by the 1990s, the worm had begun to turn. In 1989,
the Court stated a notably watered-down version of the conjunctive view with regard to warrantless searches:
Our cases indicate that even a search that may be performed without
a warrant must be based, as a general matter, on probable cause to
believe that the person to be searched has violated the law. When the
balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of probable
cause, we have usually required “some quantum of individualized
264
suspicion” before concluding that a search is reasonable.

Over the past few years, the Court has more openly embraced the view that the Warrant Clause’s requirements are
confined to certain situations, with the Reasonableness Clause
257. See AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3–17
(1997); see also TAYLOR, supra note 165, at 23–50.
258. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 202–04 (1993).
259. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950) (citation omitted).
260. Amsterdam, among others, has argued that, under the Fourth
Amendment, warrants are the touchstone of reasonableness, with only limited
exceptions. See Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 395–99.
261. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted).
262. See Maclin, supra note 258, at 204–05.
263. See id. at 205.
264. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (citations
omitted) (upholding warrantless, suspicionless drug tests of railway employees).
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governing by default. As Professor Erin Murphy describes,
“whereas ‘reasonableness’ cases used to fashion themselves as
deviations from the rule, paying homage to warrants and suspicion, such opinions increasingly have moved away from these
265
qualifiers to more expressly embrace pure ‘reasonableness.’”
In the October 2012 Term the preference for reasonableness
over a presumptive warrant requirement gained explicit adher266
ence among a minority of the Court. And in upholding the col267
lection of DNA from certain arrestees in Maryland v. King, a
majority of the Court signed on to Justice Kennedy’s quick dismissal of the Warrant Clause. He explained: “To say that no
warrant is required is merely to acknowledge that ‘rather than
employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the
privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to de268
termine if the intrusion was reasonable.’”
Viewed in this light, the warrant exceptions that adhere to
probable cause look increasingly like isolated exceptions. The
arrest exceptions may retain probable cause requirements due
to the fact that “[a]n arrest is a wholly different kind of intru269
sion upon individual freedom from a limited search,” while
the vehicle exception’s probable cause requirement may stem
as much from historical pedigree (having been established in
270
1925 ) as from a commitment to a probable cause presumption. More recent exceptions, such as that for Terry stops and
special needs searches, have looked to reasonableness as the
271
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” whether that reasonableness is through individualized suspicion or programmatic balancing of needs. Accordingly, if the courts are to craft
a new exception to the warrant requirement, they should do so
265. Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and
the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 184 (2013) (citing, inter alia, Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)); see also id. at 185 (“Although the text
of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained, this Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured. . . .
But we have also recognized that this presumption may be overcome in some
circumstances because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.” (citations omitted)).
266. See id. at 185–86 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1569
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1048 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
267. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
268. Id. at 1970 (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001)).
269. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
270. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (tracing the automobile exception back to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
271. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970.
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through the lens of the Reasonableness Clause. The next Part
discusses how that application might work.
IV. CRAFTING A REASONABLENESS INQUIRY
The question is whether the reasonableness standard can
help courts make headway in the third party context. To our
mind, the inherited third party doctrine has two key disabilities. First, it tends to deploy the Fourth Amendment in an
on/off manner, yielding a test that has difficulty accepting both
that the Fourth Amendment should apply and that the conduct
at issue is reasonable in light of the nature of the intrusion and
the information sought. Second, courts and commentators contemplating alternatives to the third party doctrine too readily
assume that if the Fourth Amendment does apply, it must be
through the Warrant Clause and not the Reasonableness
Clause. Thus far we have tried to soften each of these assumptions in favor a reasonableness-based inquiry that does not
simply toss the Fourth Amendment out the door when information is stored on a cloud server or when an individual transacts with her bank.
We want to establish that third party searches should fall
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment, while at the same
time arguing that their legality need not be tethered to the
warrant or probable clause requirements. Rather we want to
redirect the constitutional inquiry to how courts should evaluate reasonableness. One option would be follow Amar and apply
272
a kitchen-sink reasonableness inquiry in every case. Another
would enlist “special needs” cases in requiring a controlled balancing of government and private interests for different types
273
of third party search programs. A third option, meanwhile,
would dispose with the weighing of interests in every case,
while retaining the flexibility to be applied to individual cases.
274
We take as our signpost the recognition in Terry v. Ohio
that there is more than one way of evaluating reasonableness.
The famous “Terry stop” that grew out of the Court’s balancing
was not a subjective assessment of the expectation of the detainee and the police officer in any particular case. Rather, it
was an objective assessment of the types of circumstances in
which persons are likely to have a diminished expectation of
privacy and in which the ambit of police conduct is correspond272. See Amar, supra note 138, at 801.
273. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
274. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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ingly broader. The Terry Court balanced the interests not on
the specific facts, but for frisks in general, thereby allowing the
Court to distill a single test that law enforcement and lower
courts could implement moving forward: reasonable suspicion.
We are not the first to realize Terry’s special place amongst
Fourth Amendment precedents and its potential for reformation of the third party doctrine. Both Slobogin and Epstein
have pointed to Terry before. Slobogin sees Terry as an invita275
tion to set many standards varied by the level of intrusion.
For example, a home search would require “clear and convincing” evidence, which he estimates as having a “quantitatively
defined” equivalent of 75% certainty; prolonged stops would require probable cause, or 50% certainty; and short Terry stops or
roadblocks would require reasonable suspicion, or 20% to 30%
276
certainty. Slobogin uses a survey of federal judges to tie his
percentages to jurisprudential reality, but he does not concentrate on the reasoning in Terry and its progeny or its slow de277
velopment in the Supreme Court. These components of the
Terry opinion deserve analysis and provide further valuable
lessons for expanding reasonable suspicion into the third party
area.
Epstein, on the other hand, values Terry’s reasonable suspicion insofar as it allows him to split the difference between
278
full protection and no protection at all. Epstein has long argued that an examination of privacy, specifically the commonlaw tort of invasion of privacy, can have a meaningful impact
279
on clarifying longstanding constitutional principles. With respect to the Fourth Amendment, Epstein explains Katz and its
280
progeny through the private law privacy torts. He argues
that, as a starting point, the police can at least act as any pri281
vate citizen would act under the private law. Thus, he approves of Terry v. Ohio in its permitting police to follow suspects on the street—the right of any private person—and its
“operat[ion] as a sensible middle ground between a rule that allowed the police to stop and frisk at will and one that required
275. See Slobogin, supra note 117, at 1056–57.
276. Id. at 1082–83.
277. Id.
278. See Epstein, supra note 64, at 1206.
279. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First
Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1003, 1007 (2000) (examining the First Amendment through common law
privacy torts).
280. See Epstein, supra note 64, at 1212–14.
281. Id. at 1214.
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them to demonstrate probable cause for arrest.” We too recognize the doctrinal advantages of Terry as enabling a reasonableness inquiry. But we base our doctrinal justification primarily in the constitutional law of the Fourth Amendment—and in
particular the specific reasoning of Terry itself—rather than
the common law of privacy, and attempt to more fully play out
the implications of the Terry approach.
A. BUILDING BLOCKS: TERRY V. OHIO
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court faced a situation in
which it could neither deny that a law enforcement tactic constituted a search nor burden officers with the full weight of the
Warrant Clause. Prior to Terry, brief investigative stops—often
accompanied by a limited frisk for weapons—were a standard
practice for law enforcement. Yet it was not until the exclu283
sionary rule was imposed upon the states that courts began
284
to confront the informal police procedure. In 1967, a case finally reached the Court.
Detective Martin McFadden of the Cleveland Police Department was on patrol in plainclothes when he saw two men,
285
John Terry and Richard Chilton, standing on a corner. Detective McFadden continued to observe the two as each of them
walked down the street, peered into a storefront, and returned
286
to confer with the other. After several repetitions of this pattern, the two men briefly met with a third person, who then
287
walked away. McFadden suspected that the men were casing
the storefront for a robbery and “feared they may have [had] a
288
When Terry and Chilton rejoined the third man,
gun.”
McFadden confronted the group, identifying himself as a police
289
officer and asking for their names. Not receiving a response,
McFadden “grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around so that
they were facing the other two, with Terry between McFadden
282. Id. at 1216.
283. The Court adopted the exclusionary rule as a method of Fourth
Amendment enforcement in 1914, see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
398–99 (1914), and incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states in
1949, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949), but did not incorporate
the exclusionary rule itself against the states until 1961, see Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655–60 (1961).
284. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.1(a) (5th ed. 2012).
285. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968).
286. Id. at 5–6.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
289. Id. at 6–7.
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and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing,”
290
finding a revolver in one pocket. At trial, the court denied
Terry’s motion to suppress the gun and convicted him of carry291
ing a concealed weapon. An appellate court upheld the conviction on the basis that the stop and frisk at issue in Terry did
not constitute a “full-blown search,” and thus fell outside the
292
perimeter of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of
Ohio dismissed the appeal, finding that “no substantial consti293
tutional question was involved.”
Considering Terry’s motion to suppress the gun, Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. He began by rejecting the logic of the Ohio courts, stating that the Fourth
Amendment was surely implicated in the brief stop and subse294
quent search. The Terry Court nonetheless refused to suppress the weapons, thus approving the police conduct at is295
sue. Although the result itself was significant, the Court’s
reasoning was an equally momentous break with prior Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Warren’s novel approach to the question facing the Court in Terry provides a blueprint for a workable approach to the third party doctrine. Of critical importance is how
Chief Justice Warren parsed the Fourth Amendment to separate the probable cause requirement for a warrant from what
constitutes reasonable conduct in the search context. The Court
accepted that the stops at issue in Terry implicated the Fourth
Amendment. But that fact alone did not trigger the Warrant
Clause or its attendant probable cause requirement as noted in
296
Part III. Instead, the Court set out to determine the reasonableness of McFadden’s actions.
In crafting its reasonableness inquiry, the Court could
have followed the path set out by prior cases. Only one year be297
fore, in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, the
Court approved an administrative search through a reasona-

290. Id.
291. Id. at 7–8.
292. Id. at 8.
293. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
294. Id. at 19–20.
295. Id. at 30–31.
296. See id. at 18–19 (finding that the Fourth Amendment “permit[ted] a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer . . . regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime”).
297. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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298

bleness inquiry. There the Court determined reasonableness
by balancing the government interest against the private interest. The Court lamented that “[u]nfortunately, there can be no
ready test for determining reasonableness” other than by caseby-case fact intensive balancing of “the need to search against
299
the invasion which the search entails.” But while judges were
capable of weighing systematic programs through Camara-like
balancing, the Terry Court recognized a need for a test that law
enforcement officers in one-off encounters could apply in the
300
field.
Accordingly, the Court adopted a new type of reasonableness inquiry. Instead of requiring lower courts to weigh independently the interests of officer and citizen in each case, the
Court sought to create a single test, equally administrable by
courts and law enforcement alike. Rather than looking at the
specific facts of the case, the Terry Court performed a one-time
301
high-level balancing of frisks “as a general proposition.” Ultimately, the government’s interest prevailed, so long as the
302
frisk was limited in scope.
Next, the Court used the balancing it had just completed to
create a new test: “whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety
or that of others was in danger . . . [giving] due weight . . . to
the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
303
from the facts in light of his experience.” This is the remaining piece of the puzzle. So long as reasonableness was locked in
an individual-specific inquiry into subjective expectations, no
generalizable doctrine could emerge. In Terry, therefore, the
Court declined to require the weighing of government and private interests in every case; the Court instead called for an objective evaluation of the specific situation at hand, but under
304
the single, newly crafted standard. Such an approach relieved
police from the burdens of examining the extent of government
interest in a given pat down, allowing officers like McFadden to
rely on the good judgment that led to his suspicion.

298. Id. at 536–37 (describing the process of “balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails”).
299. Id.
300. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
301. Id. at 19–20.
302. Id. at 26.
303. Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
304. Id.
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Although the Terry majority never uttered the words, “rea305
sonable suspicion” has become Terry’s legacy. The Court for a
time resisted the “reasonable suspicion” standard, urging lower
courts to eschew specific articulations that “fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations
306
that arise.” More recently, however, the Court has succumbed
to the necessity of a uniform standard, characterizing Terry as
allowing police officers “to act instantly on reasonable suspicion
that the persons temporarily detained are armed and danger307
308
ous.” As noted above, the doctrine has been extended to
309
310
temporary detentions of suitcases and even cars. Irrespective of whether a uniform phrase or a more cumbersome articulation of the Terry standard is used, the Court’s reasoning is
useful in crafting a new third party doctrine.
B. THIRD PARTY BALANCING ACT
The Terry Court’s move from case-by-case balancing to a
uniform standard can be used to create an equally administrable standard for third party materials. As discussed in Part III,
though the Fourth Amendment is implicated in police acquisition of third party information, the diminished expectation of
privacy attending to such information counsels against requir311
ing either a warrant or probable cause. Only a determination
of reasonableness remains. Attempts to look at reasonableness
by distinguishing either by types of third party information or
total quantity of information, evaluated in Part II, suffer from
significant shortcomings.
Instead, courts should take a step back and conduct a onetime balancing of the reasonableness of government access to
third party material “as a general proposition,” in the hopes of
distilling a uniform standard that can be applied across contexts. In Terry, the significant governmental interest in police
safety and unfettered police investigation outweighed the in312
trusion into a protected space. The Court pointed to a trial
305. The “reasonable suspicion” language that has become synonymous
with Terry can be found in Justice Douglas’s dissent. Id. at 37 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“The term ‘probable cause’ rings a bell of certainty that is not
sounded by phrases such as ‘reasonable suspicion.’”).
306. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
307. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009).
308. See supra Part III.
309. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
310. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).
311. See supra Part III.
312. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[T]here must be a narrowly
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court’s finding that the suspect “presented a threat to the officer’s safety while he was investigating his suspicious behav313
ior.”
First, the privacy interests at stake in third party searches
differ from those searches subject to the Fourth Amendment’s
full warrant and probable cause requirements. While much ink
has been spilled arguing that third party information merits
314
Fourth Amendment protection, such a conclusion means only
that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information turned over to others. Measuring the extent of the
privacy interest, however, is another matter. As has been established, the expectation of privacy is much diminished as
compared to the prototypical home invasion that invokes the
315
full protections of the Warrant Clause. Indeed, currently the
316
Supreme Court recognizes no such expectation. Thus, without
vastly departing from current doctrine, the Court could find a
private interest at stake comparable to the interest in being
free from a brief pat down, due to the legitimate but lesser expectation of privacy in each case.
Turning to the government interest at stake, the absence of
the officer safety rationale obviously distinguishes third party
searches from Terry. Whereas the interactions contemplated by
Terry offer the potential for violent confrontation between officers and suspects, third party searches are defined by a lack of
contact between officers and suspects (this lack of contact, in
317
fact, is part of what makes such searches valuable). Yet the
logic of Terry does not rise or fall with officer safety; in Place,
the Court extended Terry to brief detentions of luggage at air318
ports. The Court found “a generalized interest in law enforcement” sufficient to “justify an intrusion on an individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of probable
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons . . . regardless of
whether [the police officer] has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime.”).
313. Id. at 28.
314. Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right
to Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1108
(2006) (advocating that the Court overrule the third party doctrine); see also
supra Part I.B.
315. See supra Part III.B.2.
316. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (citing Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)); see also supra Part I.
317. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 562–63 (explaining that third party information is valuable to investigators “as [third parties] are more likely to cooperate and less likely to tip off the suspect that an investigation is afoot”).
318. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702–04 (1983).
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319

cause.” As discussed in Part III, there is a substantial law enforcement interest in access to third party information at the
initial stages of investigation—not merely after probable cause
sufficient to obtain a warrant has already been established.
Developing leads and building probable cause requires the
gathering of clues nearly impossible without access to at least
some third party information.
Weighing the privacy interest with the government need,
courts should, as in Terry, craft a uniform standard that takes
account of the different sides of the ledger. In the next section,
we explain what such a standard should look like, taking as its
cue the reasonable suspicion standard created in Terry.
C. A NEW THIRD PARTY TEST
A reasonable suspicion test for third party searches could
operate as a practical middle ground between requiring warrants and probable cause, and the Court’s current refusal to
recognize any reasonable expectation of privacy. To articulate
the test, we propose looking to Terry and its progeny: officers
should be able to point to specific, articulable facts supporting a
reasonable suspicion that the third party search will turn up information relevant to an ongoing investigation, and searches
should be reasonable in scope. Both of these elements are present in Terry and its kin. While, as noted above, the common
interpretation of the case focuses on the reasonable suspicion
320
prong, the Court has also been careful to note that a search
that strays beyond the scope set by Terry runs afoul of the
321
Fourth Amendment. The application of this test will be discussed in turn.
1. Reasonable Suspicion
The reasonable suspicion test is familiar from Terry: the officer must have “reason to believe” that the search is necessary,
based upon “the specific reasonable inferences which he is enti322
tled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” In the
context of a third party search, there would have to be a reasonable belief that the search will turn up relevant information. Courts have found such a standard administrable in
323
the context of the Stored Communications Act (the SCA),
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 703–04.
See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009).
See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (“Requirements for Court Order.—A court
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324

which adopts the Terry standard. In United States v. Perrine,
for example, the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether a request for
the defendant’s IP address and name was based on “specific
and articulable facts” that supported “a reasonable suspicion
325
that [the defendant] was involved in child pornography.”
Pointing to the police officer’s affidavit, in which he described
conversing with a witness and viewing the witness’s chat logs,
the court found that the search was reasonable under the SCA
326
standard.
2. Reasonable Scope
The second inquiry for the courts would be whether a third
party search is reasonable in scope. In Terry, the Court made
clear that protective frisks “must be limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to
327
harm the officer or others nearby.” Application of this standard to third party searches poses some difficulty; while the
purpose of a Terry frisk is officer protection, the purpose of a
third party search is acquisition of information. Terry’s language, however, provides guidance. Third party searches can be
328
limited to “that which is necessary” to the investigation.
Therefore, an indiscriminate dredging of third party information unrelated to the object of the investigation, or clearly
exceeding the bounds necessary to acquire the sought-after information, would go beyond the permissible scope of the search.
In the third party context, courts would have to examine
the nexus between the method used and the information
sought. Take, for example, Smith, where the Court focused entirely on the question of whether the pen register installed on
the suspect’s phone constituted a search. The Court could instead have examined the specific and articulable facts that led
the police to believe that this limited quantity of information—
order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that
is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or
the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).
324. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.
2008) (“[T]he ‘specific and articulable facts’ standard derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry. Thus, we are familiar with the standard imposed.”).
325. Id. at 1203.
326. Id. at 1204–05.
327. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
328. Id.
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329

a mere single day of pen register data —would provide information relevant to the investigation. Such evidence was legion:
the victim of a robbery had provided police with a description of
a pattern of harassing phone calls associated with a man in a
vehicle driving by her house, and on this basis the police observed the vehicle’s license plate, traced it to the defendant’s
330
address, and requested the pen register. Yet in other circumstances, an equally limited search via pen register could fail
this test, if the police had no specific and articulable basis for
thinking that the pen register would produce relevant information.
D. EVALUATING THE TEST
The proposed test has four major advantages over its rivals: first, it provides standing for defendants to challenge
searches, and in doing so enables judicial oversight over police
surveillance and investigation tactics; second, it does not overly
disrupt current police practice; third, it is easily administrable;
and fourth, it preserves the advantages of the current third
party doctrine.
1. Judicial Oversight Through Standing
Having tied our proposed test to the reasonable suspicion
standard, we acknowledge its susceptibility to the myriad criticisms levied against Terry. Numerous voices in the academy
rail against Terry’s test, which they criticize as a paltry restraint on police misbehavior, as well as its metastasis from
331
narrow exception to presumptive default. Yet even partially
329. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
330. Id.
331. Attempting to catalogue the criticisms of the Terry doctrine would be
unwise, but even a small collection demonstrates scholars’ general dissatisfaction. See, e.g., Thomas Gerry Bufkin, Terry and Miranda: The Conflict Between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 18
MISS. C. L. REV. 199, 204 (1997) (“[T]he lower federal courts have proceeded on
their path to expanding the permissible scope of police action in a Terry
stop.”); Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 747 (1994) (arguing that courts have
not remained true to Terry’s premises); Daniel C. Isaacs, Miranda’s Application to the Expanding Terry Stop, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 383, 387 (2009) (“The permissible degree of intrusion during a ‘stop and frisk’ has significantly expanded since 1968.”); Rachel Karen Laser, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on
Refusals To Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1995)
(“[C]ourts have interpreted the ‘totality of the circumstances’ broadly, thus expanding the scope of what constitutes an acceptable Terry stop.”); Michael J.
Roth, Berkemer Revisited: Uncovering the Middle Ground Between Miranda
and the New Terry, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2779, 2779 (2009) (“[A]ppellate courts
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accepting this critique, the reasonable suspicion test for third
party information provides valuable protection, striking the
proper balance between privacy and law enforcement interests.
We believe this to be true for two reasons, one doctrinal and the
other practical.
First, the reasonable suspicion test provides persons the
right to challenge the collection of their personal information
held by third parties. Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, individuals who provide their information to third
parties cannot dispute the collection of their information based
332
on a lack of standing under the Fourth Amendment. Fourth
Amendment standing requires that a person challenging the
introduction of evidence show a recognized expectation of privacy in the evidence seized before suppression will be enter333
tained. Thus, the third party doctrine all but prevents litigants from challenging third party seizures because the Court
refuses to recognize any expectation of privacy on the part of
the defendant. Instead, standing attaches to the possessor of
334
the information at the time of the government’s search. The
reasonable suspicion test would correct this deficiency by recognizing an expectation of privacy, even if diminished, sufficient to bestow standing to challenge the introduction of evidence.
Consider the effect of the reasonable suspicion test on an
335
early third party case. In United States v. Payner, the Court
refused to suppress bank records obtained from a bank execuhave significantly expanded the scope of police authority to stop and frisk potential suspects without probable cause . . . .”). At times, the judiciary has echoed the scholarly frustration. See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464
(10th Cir. 1993) (“The last decade . . . has witnessed a multifaceted expansion
of Terry.”); United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir.
1990) (“[The doctrine has] expanded beyond [its] original contours, in order to
permit reasonable police action when probable cause is arguably lacking.”).
332. See generally Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy:
Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U.
MEM. L. REV. 907, 909–12 (1997) (describing Fourth Amendment standing).
While courts no longer evaluate standing as an explicit factor in their
analyses, standing has become part of the examination of reasonable expectation of privacy. See DeFilippis, supra note 314, at 1102 & n.62.
333. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (“A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property
has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”).
334. See DeFilippis, supra note 314, at 1102 (“The third-party doctrine has
effectively denied standing to defendants who allege illegal government seizure of personal data held [by others].”).
335. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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tive. Though the case seemed to fall squarely under Miller,
336
which also involved bank records, the method through which
police obtained the records raised questions. The government
agents illegally entered into the apartment of a bank’s vice
president, stole his briefcase, and copied the contents of documents containing the financial information of one of the bank’s
337
clients. When the government attempted to introduce the evidence in prosecuting the bank’s client, the trial court sup338
pressed the evidence, with the court of appeals affirming. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed; although the Court recognized that “no court should condone the unconstitutional and
possibly criminal behavior of those who planned and executed
this ‘briefcase caper,’” the Court refused to suppress the admission of the evidence against the defendant on the grounds that
it was only the vice president’s privacy interest that had been
339
intruded upon. Under the reasonable suspicion test, by contrast, recognition of Payner’s privacy interest in the documents—even if diminished—would eliminate the bar to consideration of the illegality of the search. As the Court recognized
340
in Rakas v. Illinois, a defendant in Payner’s situation could
“contest the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search
341
if [his] own property were seized during the search.” And of
course, a defendant’s ability to challenge a search allows a
court the ability to weigh in on the investigatory techniques at
issue, rather than being forced to impotently condone the conduct based on the party at the defense table.
2. Administrability
The proposed reasonable suspicion standard should be administrable both by law enforcement agencies and the courts.
The standard and procedure associated with the test is familiar
to the police, the defense bar, and the courts alike. Defense attorneys are experienced in probing claims of reasonable suspicion and judges practiced at adjudicating disputes under the
standard.

336. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–38 (1976).
337. Payner, 447 U.S. at 729–30.
338. Id. at 730–31.
339. Id. at 733–35 (“[T]he supervisory power does not authorize a federal
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was
seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court.”).
340. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
341. Id. at 142 n.11.
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Most importantly, the standard is easily applied by law enforcement. Discussing the warrantless searches of vehicles incident to arrest, the Court stated that
Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . is primarily intended to regulate the
police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in
terms that are readily applicable by the police. . . . A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts . . . may
be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and
judges eagerly feed, but they may be literally impossible of applica342
tion by the officer in the field.

In another context, the Court has noted that “law enforcement officers need to know, with certainty and beforehand,
343
when renewed interrogation is lawful.” Certainly the existing
standard—all third party searches are constitutionally unregulated—provides that certainty.
But assuming the need for some regulation, a standard
based upon reasonableness should not fall prey to the seduction
of sophistication. Unlike mosaic theory, which requires law enforcement officers to constantly survey the entirety quantity of
gathered information from an abstract perch, the reasonable
suspicion test requires evaluation of only one piece of information at a time. Furthermore, it is evaluated objectively from
the perspective of a reasonable officer, rather than from the
perspective of the target or society at large.
Viewed from the perspective of courts, meanwhile, the Terry standard—through its incorporation into the Stored Communication Act—has already proven an applicable standard for
344
courts. In United States v. Perrine, the Tenth Circuit noted its
familiarity with the Terry standard and applied the “specific
and articulable facts” requirement to the affidavit the United
States had submitted in support of its request for electronic
345
subscriber information. The Tenth Circuit went on to note
that the greater protections of the Fourth Amendment did not
346
apply to such information, but it is apparent that were the
constitutional framework raised to the standard required under
the statutory framework, it would not overly tax courts.
Similarly, state supreme courts have applied the Terry
framework under their state constitutions to at least some cat342. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting LaFave, supra note 152, at 141–42), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009).
343. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010).
344. 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008).
345. Id. at 1202–04.
346. Id. at 1204–05.
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egories of searches that currently go unprotected under the
347
Fourth Amendment. In Litchfield v. State, the Indiana Su348
preme Court rejected the rule of California v. Greenwood and
imposed upon the police, before searching garbage, “a requirement of articulable individualized suspicion, essentially the
349
same as is required for a ‘Terry stop’ of an automobile.” The
Alaska Supreme Court followed suit, applying to searches of
garbage “[t]he reasonable suspicion standard . . . most often
350
applied in the context of investigatory stop-and-frisks.” Professor Stephen E. Henderson has endorsed the departure of
states from the Supreme Court’s third party doctrine; though
he expresses concern over the difficulty of application of complex, multilayered standards, he has noted the comparative
simplicity of a single standard of suspicion laid out beforehand:
One saving grace may be that such decisions can be made without requiring discretion and hard work on the part of police officers in the
field. Once a court requires a given quantum of suspicion and/or a
given procedure to obtain a certain type of information, officers (and
351
attorneys) will have clear guidance.

We agree, and are optimistic that the reasonable suspicion
standard, built for administrability by police in the Terry stop
context, can be transferred to the collection of third party information without unduly taxing officers of the court or the
law.
3. Maintaining Doctrinal Advantages
Kerr identifies two vital attributes of the Fourth Amendment as currently constituted that would be eviscerated under
the many critics’ alternative schemes: technological neutrality
352
and ex ante clarity. The third party doctrine ensures that the
Fourth Amendment remains technologically neutral by extending preexisting protections to communicative or storage func353
tions without regard to the form used. By focusing on the
technology used, Kerr argues, proposed alternatives might allow criminals to purposefully refrain from using third party
services lacking protection and instead choose to funnel com347. 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005).
348. 486 U.S. 35, 39–45 (1988) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed on the street).
349. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 364.
350. Beltz v. State, 221 P.3d 328, 336 (Alaska 2009).
351. Henderson, supra note 69, at 423.
352. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 579–81 (technological neutrality); id. at
581–83 (ex ante clarity).
353. See id. at 579–81.

2016]

RESTORING REASON

1043

munication through channels receiving Fourth Amendment
354
protection. Whereas the third party doctrine does not differentiate between toll records and social media posts, another regime recognizing special protection for social media would funnel insidious communications through Facebook. He argues
that proposals lacking such neutrality allow criminals to shield
355
their malfeasance through a “substitution effect.” Instead of
passing messages through unprotected mediums, criminals will
opt to communicate only on technologies that the Fourth
356
Amendment protects.
Kerr also notes that the current third party doctrine provides the Fourth Amendment with ex ante clarity. The doctrine
ensures that, upon reaching its destination, information sheds
any prior status for whatever protections it receives in its cur357
rent location. Providing protection based on where the information originated would only cause confusion for law enforce358
ment. The alternative, asking officers to know from where the
data they request originated, would tremendously complicate
police procedures for subpoena and seizure, leading to signifi359
cantly more suppressions at trial.
The reasonable suspicion test would maintain both technological neutrality and ex ante clarity. Applying a uniform
standard for all third party information ensures technological
360
neutrality. Whether police wish to use written bank records
or e-mail metadata, they must use the same faculties of reason
buttressed by specific, articulable facts, and the courts will engage in the same reasonable suspicion analysis. In fact, the
reasonable suspicion approach might be more technologically
neutral than current doctrine. Kerr has acknowledged, in response to Epstein’s similar suggestion to create an intermediate zone of reasonable suspicion, that a more flexible approach
would ease the cliff effect between full-blown warrant-and-

354. Id. at 580 (“Those who have the most to hide have the most incentive
to take advantage of how third-party services can hide their activity.”).
355. Id. at 574–76; see also Reid, supra note 244, at 615–17.
356. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 574–76.
357. Id. at 582 (“[The doctrine] guarantees that once information is present
in a location it is treated just like everything else located there.”).
358. Id. (“Because the history of information is erased when it arrives, the
law can impose rules as to what the police can or cannot do based on the
known location of the search instead of the unknown history of the information obtained.”).
359. Id. at 581–82.
360. See id. at 579–81 (describing the Katz test as technologically neutral
because it could be applied uniformly).
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probable-cause protection and no protection at all; accordingly,
it would reduce the incentive to substitute forms of communica361
tion.
Similarly, the reasonable suspicion standard provides ex
ante clarity, with a single standard of reasonable suspicion applicable across types of information. Admittedly, the current
doctrine’s blanket lack of protection is even clearer, but Kerr’s
concerns regarding the burden on police to determine where information originated is unfounded under the reasonable suspicion test. If, as Kerr contends, clarity is intended to ensure the
362
police understand the rules, a test relying on the perspective
of a reasonable officer fulfills that requirement.
By contrast, most substitutes for the third party doctrine
cannot satisfy Kerr’s criteria. The mosaic theory, for example,
would drastically reduce clarity for law enforcement officers
who will be faced with the difficult question of how much data
363
is too much. Justice Alito recognized the difficulty of determining exactly how much GPS data would constitute an unrea364
sonable search; imagine an officer trying to determine how
many Facebook posts, cellphone location requests, and phone
numbers dialed she could examine before running afoul of the
Fourth Amendment. Similarly, a pure reasonableness balancing approach would destroy any semblance of clarity for officers. Amar’s reliance on the wisdom of the community, expressed through jury verdicts, to dictate reasonableness would
365
Meanwhile categorization,
prove impossible to predict.
though clear ex ante, would violate the precept of technological
neutrality either through protecting certain technologies over
366
others—as social media proponents suggest —or by broadly
blanketing practically all digital third party information with
367
protection—as Solove’s system of records would.

361. See Kerr, supra note 74.
362. Id. at 1236 (“The police need certain answers about what rules they
must follow.”).
363. Kerr, supra note 101, at 341 (“[O]fficers may understandably cross the
line without personal culpability.”).
364. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment).
365. See supra Part II.C (arguing that pure balancing is unworkable for
officers in the field).
366. See supra Part II.B (describing arguments in favor of exempting social
media information from the third party doctrine).
367. See supra Part II.B (criticizing Professor Solove’s critique as overbroad).
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V. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
As noted above, an important advantage of the reasonable
suspicion test is that it eases the cliff effect between the full
protections of the Warrant Clause and the absence of Fourth
Amendment protections altogether. Subjecting third party
searches to the Reasonableness Clause, however, does create
its own new line-drawing problem: When does an investigatory
tactic become a third party search, subjecting it to the reasonable suspicion test? Further, the reasonable suspicion test does
not resolve some of the difficult questions currently confronting
courts about the boundary between the third party doctrine
and a “full blown search” requiring warrant and probable
cause. And finally, the reasonable suspicion framework only
applies to third party searches based on individualized suspicion. While this Article’s test does not incorporate the data mining programs currently before the courts, it provides a path for
courts and future scholars to follow in addressing them.
A. THIRD PARTY SEARCHES AND NONSEARCHES
Defining the limit between third party searches and
nonsearches would be a novel task for courts, one that had previously been unnecessary due to Smith and Miller. Courts
would confront such questions as: whether the use of secret
agents and informants—identified by Kerr as a key progenitor
of the third party doctrine’s concentration on business rec368
ords —constitutes a third party search; whether government
agents must probe the source of anonymous tips to determine
369
whether they compromise third party information; and when
information is exposed to the public at large as opposed to be370
ing entrusted to specific third parties. Yet such questions
should not prove overly vexing to either officers or courts. Officers do not need to prove the extent of the privacy interest on
the other side of the ledger before acting in these circumstances. They simply need to be able to point to specific, articulable
facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that evidence is to be
found within a search of reasonable scope. It is true that such a
limitation would engender more self-reflection than complete
368. Kerr, supra note 2, at 567–69.
369. Kerr offers the example of police receiving an anonymous tip alleging
a politician’s corruption, and posits five potential sources that could implicate
the third party doctrine to varying degrees. See id. at 584–85.
370. Cf., e.g., Strandburg, supra note 105, at 671–75 (offering the examples
of Facebook messages, Facebook profile information, and posts in a public
chatroom).

1046

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:987

freedom from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, but the resulting
behavior should emulate best practices of investigation—
focused inquiry rather than blind casting about—or prove a
welcome correction.
For courts, meanwhile, hard cases at the boundary could
often be dispatched by looking first to the behavior of the police:
if the police acted upon reasonable suspicion and confined to a
reasonable scope, there would be no need to ask whether the
information acquired fell within the third party doctrine or outside the Fourth Amendment altogether. It is only where the police had no reasonable suspicion or the scope of their search
was unreasonable that it would be necessary to ask whether a
search had taken place.
B. THIRD PARTY SEARCHES AND FULL BLOWN SEARCHES
The reasonable suspicion test tells courts how they are to
evaluate third party searches, rather than what constitutes a
third party search. In other words, the difficult line already
confronted by courts between third party searches and “full
blown searches” would still need to be drawn. For example, the
traditional content/noncontent distinction has held that the
outside of a package or envelope is publicly viewable and contains no content carrying significant privacy interests, while its
inner contents are protected; courts have begun to encounter
the question of how this distinction translates to digital infor371
mation such as e-mails and detailed browsing history. Other
questions that may arise including whether use of a computerized automated remote backup system—such as Dropbox—
constitutes entrusting one’s information to a third party in the
absence of any expectation that the remote server will actually
372
access that information. While our test cannot solve these
problems, by creating an alternative between no protection and
probable cause it reduces the “incredible pressure on the courts
to reduce the scope of the Fourth Amendment by narrowly de373
fining ‘search’ and ‘seizure.’”

371. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 & n.6 (9th
Cir. 2008).
372. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Court relied heavily
upon an extended discussion of the uses to which phone companies put records
of calls sent and received, and users’ expectations thereof. Id. at 742–43.
373. Slobogin, supra note 117, at 1067.
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C. DATA MINING
Perhaps the most immediate debate around the Fourth
374
Amendment surrounds data mining. Data mining takes two
primary forms: “target-driven data mining,” which is “a search
of records to obtain information about an identified target”; and
“[e]vent-driven data mining, also called pattern-based surveil375
lance,” which “does not start with an identified suspect.” Target-driven data mining, as the name suggests, is driven by individualized suspicion about the target, thus rendering it sussusceptible to the reasonable suspicion test. Pattern-based data
mining, by contrast, does not operate on individualized suspicion. For this pattern-based variety, while the reasonable suspicion framework does not apply, the Reasonableness Clause of
the Fourth Amendment may provide an alternative path forward.
376
When the government seeks to access a set of third party
records—whether in the hands of third parties or the govern377
ment itself —about a specific individual, this Article’s framework can help courts evaluate the reasonableness of that access
374. See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (permitting the NSA’s mass collection of telephonic metadata), vacated, 785 F.3d
787 (2d Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30–37 (D.D.C. 2013)
(opposite), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
375. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 322–23 (2008). Slobogin also provides a
third category, “match-driven data mining,” which seeks to ascertain whether
a suspect is, for example, already in a fingerprint, facial-recognition, or DNA
database. Id.
376. A further question, outside the scope of this Article, is whether the collection of such data—as opposed to its analysis—implicates privacy concerns
(and, by extension, the Fourth Amendment). Compare, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053
.html (“But machine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade
privacy.”), and William J. Stuntz, Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW
REPUBLIC (Apr. 17, 2006), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/against-privacy
-and-transparency (“The best way to stop the nightmare from happening is to
limit not what information officials can gather, but what they can do with the
information they find.”), with Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the SecurityLiberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 356 (2008) (“It is certainly true that
disclosure and use of information can create significant privacy problems. But
collection can create problems as well.”).
377. Whether mass databases of third party information, such as telephonic and internet metadata, should be held by the government or by third parties
is a live controversy as of this Article’s writing. See Jack Goldsmith, Bruce
Schneier
on
NSA
v.
Private
Meta-Data
Storage,
LAWFARE
(Feb. 14, 2014, 4:18 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/bruce-schneier
-on-nsa-v-private-meta-data-storage (describing an ongoing debate on who
should warehouse NSA data).
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as a matter of Fourth Amendment law. Take, for example, the
facts of Smith, where the government was seeking to confirm
the identity of a stalker and possible robber based upon de378
scriptions of phone calls received by the victim. If the government had potentially available to it all of Smith’s phone
calls, bank records, internet domains visited, Facebook activity,
e-mails sent and received, etc., what of this information could it
reasonably access? This Article’s test would demand that the
government demonstrate reasonable suspicion that a given set
of records would produce evidence relevant to the investigation,
and that the scope of the search not exceed that which is necessary. Given the witness’s description of several days of harassing phone calls, the government would be entitled to access
Smith’s phone records over that time period. Bank records
would be a closer question, but the government could reasonably suspect that Smith might have received and deposited a
significant amount of money following the robbery, depending
on what was taken. However, his browser history, e-mail contacts, and Facebook activity would all be too unlikely to yield
379
evidence of the crimes, and thus would fall outside the reasonable scope of the search.
For pattern-based data mining, the reasonable suspicion
framework would not provide a workable solution, any more
than one could stop and frisk an entire street full of people because one suspects that one of them might have a gun. However, courts could follow the doctrinal framework set out in Part
III to evaluate the mass analysis of third party data through
the lens of the Reasonableness Clause. Under this analysis,
pattern-based data mining would constitute a suspicionless
programmatic search akin to those that have been analyzed
under the Court’s special needs doctrine, where courts balance
380
Under such a
intrusiveness against government need.
framework, for example, the Second Circuit upheld
suspicionless bag searches in the New York City subway in the
381
wake of the London tube bombings. In the context of data
378. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
379. It is obviously possible to imagine that such records could turn up evidence of a crime, but from the facts of Smith there would be no specific, articulable facts to so suggest.
380. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67, 76–86 (2001); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–66
(1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693
(1987)).
381. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2d Cir. 2006).

2016]

RESTORING REASON

1049

mining, courts would have to weigh the privacy intrusion of the
mass analysis of third party information against the government’s interest. This evaluation is far beyond the scope of this
Article—and would depend heavily upon the details of a particular program—but the relocation of third party searches from
outside the Fourth Amendment to within its Reasonableness
Clause offers a doctrinal path forward for future analyses.
CONCLUSION
Controversy surrounding the third party doctrine will not
abide any time soon. On one side are those who believe that the
protections of warrant and probable cause requirements long
afforded to private information need to be extended onto the
platforms where such information now resides. On the other
side are those who believe that, in an era when commercial actors can assemble stunningly detailed portraits of one’s relationships, habits, and proclivities, such requirements would
hamstring the government in the service of providing no more
than an illusory fig leaf of privacy. The middle ground outlined
in this Article will likely satisfy neither camp. Yet as a matter
of Fourth Amendment law, the third party doctrine fits naturally within the warrant exceptions subject to a rule of reasonableness. And, as a practical matter, such a move will allow
courts to impose a uniform standard that will provide necessary oversight to curb the worst abuses of privacy while affording discretion and clarity to law enforcement.

